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CHAPTER 2 
Evidence 
MITCHELL J. SIKORA, JR. • 
§2.1. Introduction. One should never force generalization upon 
the Survey year's random run of decisions, especially in the law of evi-
dence. Still, a few cautious observations beckon from the 1973 season. 
The first is that the Massachusetts appellate courts seldom overturned 
the work product of a criminal trial by reason of evidentiary error. This 
pattern resulted not so much from the application of constitutional doc-
trine as from the more practical operation of curative jury instructions 
and the rule of harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. A second 
tendency was the courts' readier willingness to reverse civil results in 
the area of tort liability for personal injury. Third, in both the civil 
and criminal setting, the state courts hewed closely to the literal text 
of evidentiary statutes, specifically those governing the admissibility of 
evidence for the commitment of sexually dangerous persons and the 
use of business records and official reports. Finally, on the federal side, 
one saw the advent of the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts 
and Magistrates and their substitution for state common law rules as a 
reference for the federal courts. It remains to be seen whether the 
Massachusetts courts will draw from the same rules for the moderniza-
tion of their own common law of evidence. 
I. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 
§2.2. Criminal identification evidence. The 1973 Survey year pro-
duced two decisions illustrative of the Supreme Judicial Court's respect 
for the judgment of the trial courts' admission of evidence of criminal 
identification.l Each upheld the admission of identifying testimony chal-
lenged on the basis of suggestive out-of-court confrontations. 
• MITCHELL J. SIKORA, JR. is associated with the Boston firm of Burns and Levinson 
and is the author of the chapter on State and Local Government in the 1970 Annual 
Survey of Massachusetts Law. 
§2.2. 1 Commonwealth v. Leaster, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 15!13, 287 N.E.2d 122; Com· 
monwealth v. Denault, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1703, 289 N.E.2d 863. For a critique of the 
Supreme Judicial Court's reluctance to disturb the trial judge's conclusions on questions 
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A brief synopsis of some of the more recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions will be helpful. The Court in United States v. Wade2 
held that a pretrial lineup was a "critical stage" of criminal proceedings 
and that the accused is therefore entitled to assistance of counsel within 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. In-court identification based upon 
a defendant's uncounseled lineup or show-up exposure was therefore 
considered inadmissible, unless the prosecution could show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the identification rested on a source inde-
pendent of, and untainted by, the uncounseled viewing. In addition, 
Gilbert v. Califomia3 held that a witness's testimony that he had previ-
ously identified the accused at a lineup was excludible per se if it 
derived from an uncounseled lineup. More recently, in Kirby v. Illinois,4 
the Court drastically restricted the Wade-Gilbert doctrine to post-indict-
ment confrontation and identification. 
Stovall v. Dennors and Simmons v. United States6 clarified the bound-
aries of general due process protection in other pretrial identification 
procedures not requiring the assistance of counsel, but which, by their 
circumstances, might be unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to "ir-
reparable mistaken identification." A denial of due process turned on 
the totality of the circumstances. 
Recent Massachusetts cases have shown that the exclusion of identifi-
cation evidence under the Sixth Amendment doctrines of Wade and 
Gilbert or under the circumstantial due process rules of Stovall and 
Simmons will not be commonplace in this state. In Commonwealth v. 
Leaster,T the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, 
armed robbery, and assault and battery by means of a deadly weapon. 
The charges arose from the robbery of a small variety store. At about 
4:00 P.M. two men had entered the store; one had held a gun to the 
head of the proprietor's wife and, when the proprietor had come to her 
assistance from the back room, shot him. The two had then fled with 
of prejudicial confrontation and identification, see Liacos, 1972 Arin. Surv. Law §12.1. 
Professor Liacos observes the court's growing impatience with the stream of confronta-
tion cases generated by the Supreme Court's decisions. If the volume of such cases 
influenced their outcome, the 19711 Survey year-the first for the new Appeals Court-
offers only two full decisions and bodes a sharp reduction. 
2 1188 u.s. 218 (1967). 
8 1188 u.s. 2611 (1967). 
' 406 u.s. 682 (1972). 
IS 1188 U.S. 2911 (1967). In Stovall, it was held that the use of a hospital room iden-
tification by a witness the day after she had undergone major life-saving surgery for 
critical injuries inflicted by her assailant and who identified the defendant when he was 
shown to her alone and while handcuffed to police officers did not offend due process. 
6 1190 U.S. 1177 (1968). In Simmons, it was held that convictions based on eyewitness 
identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside 
on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissively 
suggestive as to give rise to. a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification • 
. T 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 151111, 287 N.E.2d 122. 
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proceeds from the cash register. A customer had been present in the 
store throughout the incident. 
Police had arrived at about 4:25 P.M. and taken the husband to the 
hospital where he died at 4:30 P.M. A description of the two men ob-
tained from the wife had been broadcast on police radio. At 5:15 P.M. 
the defendant had been arrested because he fitted the description. Arrest-
ing police had taken the defendant to the hospital and transferred him 
to another police vehicle in the parking lot. At that moment the wife 
had been leaving the hospital and had identified the defendant as the 
man who had shot her husband. Both the wife and the witnessing 
customer made in-court identifications of the defendant as the robber 
who had shot the husband. The defendant testified that he had been 
at home at the time of the crime, an alibi corroborated by a woman with 
whom he was living. 
The trial judge excluded from evidence station house identifications 
made later in the evening by the wife and the witness, but admitted the 
wife's testimony of the hospital identification and the in-court identifi-
cations by both wife and customer. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the hospital parking lot identi-
fication was not a confrontation denying the defendant assistance of 
counsel or due process of law under the Wade-Gilbert or Stovall-Simmons 
doctrines. The decision did not turn on the rule of Kirby v. Illinois 
limiting Wade and Gilbert to indicted defendants. Instead the court 
found the evidence on voir dire to support i:he finding that the parking 
lot meeting had been an accident resulting from a police effort at a 
legitimate bedside confrontation with a dying victim,s and that the 
accidental meeting simply had not been unfair or suggestive. Further, it 
characterized the confrontation, occurring within an hour and a half 
after the shooting as one "in the course of (or immediately following) 
a criminal episode" and therefore within a class of its cases consistently 
excepted from the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule because in the 
totality of the circumstances they did not threaten irreparable mistaken 
identification. 9 
In addition, it was held that the admission of the in-court identifica-
tions by both the wife and witness rested on the ground of their inde-
pendent origin at the event of the crimes where both had had ample 
opportunity to observe and remember the defendant.1o 
In the second Massachusetts decision in the area of criminal identifica-
tion, Commonwealth v. Denault,U the defendant was convicted of break-
ing and entering a dwelling house at night to commit larceny and of 
8 Id. at 1535, 287 N .E.2d at 124. 
9 Id. at 1536, 287 N.E.2d at 125. 
10 Id. at 1537-40, 287 N.E.2d at 126-27. 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1703, 289 N.E.2d 863. 
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larceny of a purse. About 11:45 P.M. a man had entered the victim's 
bedroom, picked up her purse, then fled the premises through a pantry 
window, but not without affording his victim "a good look at him by 
the night light in the pantry."12 The victim and a neighbor had followed 
the suspect outdoors and had been able to take the registration number 
of a suspected getaway car, summon police, and describe the intruder 
and the car. About I: 15 A.M. one of the police spotted the car, stopped 
it, and, joined by several other police, observed that the defendant 
matched the description, and placed all three occupants of the vehicle 
under arrest. Although the arresting police radioed ·that the victim be 
driven to the station, a cruiser instead drove her to the scene of the 
arrest where, without prompting, she identified both the car and the 
suspect. At the trial she again identified the defendant and testified to 
the arrest scene identification. 
The court allowed the evidence from the out-of-court confrontation 
on multiple grounds. It reasoned that the confrontation an hour and 
three-quarters after the burglary, as part of a continuing police investi-
gation immediately following the criminal episode, was not, amid the 
"totality of the circumstances," a denial of due process. Those circum-
stances included: first, the fact that the identification was spontaneous 
not prompted by police, and second, the general consideration that 
"[s]uch prompt meetings of victim and suspect are a routine and quite 
natural means of assuring reliable identification and preventing unjust 
detention of the innocent,"13 so long as unabused by suggestive presenta-
tion. One additional point of significance was the admission of police 
testimony corroborating the victim's out-of-court identification, not for 
the truth of the identification but for confirmation of its occurrence only, 
a narrower purpose for which a "limiting instruction might have been 
appropriate . . . ."14 The in-court identification had the independent 
source of the victim's view in the night light evidenced by her accurate 
description of the defendant. 
In sum, then, the exclusion of identification evidence under the Sixth 
Amendment doctrines of Wade and Gilbert or the circumstantial due 
process rule of Stovall and Simmons will be unusual in Massachusetts 
because (1) the defendant has not been indicted within the mean-
ing of Kirby v. Illinois, or (2) the in-court identification rests on an 
independent source, usually a confrontation at the time of the crime, 
or (3) the out-of-court confrontation and identification follows fast upon 
the crime for the avowed policies of reliable identification and elimina-
tion of the innoce~t suspect, or (4) the confrontation itself is simply not 
unfair in the totality of the circumstances. It will require a rare episode 
of abuse to defeat each and every one of these saving rationales. 
12 Id. at 170!1, 289 N .E.2d at 864. 
13 Id. at 1705, 289 N.E.2d at 865. 
14 Id. at 1706, 289 N.E.2d at 866. 
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§2.3. Criminal confessions and admissions. The Massachusetts ap-
pellate courts on three occasions rejected claims that questionable con-
fessions or admissions were sources of reversible error and, despite 
disapproval of their admission into evidence, found their impact either 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt1 or remedied by limiting instruc-
tions. The decisions suggest that the courts would have preferred the 
original exclusion of the evidence. 
In Commonwealth v. Masskow2 the defendant was convicted of murder 
in the second degree for the shooting of his brother-in-law. The defendant 
lived in the same house with his sister and brother-in-law, witnessed a 
number of regular wife beatings by the victim and had often asked him 
to stop. Masskow had a limited education, a long history of alcoholism 
and possible drug addiction. He kept guns as a hobby and had never 
had steady employment. 
Shortly after the unwitnessed 1:30 A.M. shooting in the victim's bed-
room, the defendant made spontaneous direct and inferential confessions 
to a neighbor and two police officers, and a further admission of the 
shooting to a third officer interrogating him after proper constitutional 
warnings. The testimony of the neighbor and all three police was ad-
mitted. Subsequent evidence brought into question the defendant's 
mental competency at the time of the shooting and confessions. The 
Supreme Judicial Court addressed the issue of the admissibility of a 
confession from one with questionable mental capacity as well as the 
remedial course for the trial judge. 
First, on authority of the Supreme Court's decision in Blackburn v. 
Alabama~Bjt noted that "once it becomes apparent that the accused's 
mental condition is a factor that ought to be looked into in relation to 
the admissibility of his confession, the trial judge on his own motion 
should order a hearing on the defendant's capacity to make the con-
fession."4 Secondly, it applied, out of comity and anticipation of the 
federal habeas corpus remedy, the First Circuit's rulell that a trial judge 
facing substantial evidence of the defendant's insanity at the time of 
such spontaneous or responsive self-incriminations must create a record 
of "unmistakeable clarity" that he considered their character as "the 
product of a rational intellect."6 This standard exacted more than. the 
Massachusetts decisions would have, but the court nonetheless applied it 
§2.!1. 1 "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must 
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman 
v. California, !186 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. !171, !172 
(1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 4!12 (1972). 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1817, 290 N.E.2d 154. 
8 !161 u.s. 199 (1960). 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1821, 290 N.E.2d at 157. 
II Eisen v. Picard, 452 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1971), c:ert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). 
e Id. at 86!1-65. 
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and found the admission of Masskow's statements erroneous. However, 
the evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt on the ques-
tion whether the defendant had committed the shooting, since inde-
pendent evidence in point was overwhelming. While the result was 
unaffected, the court nonetheless used the occasion to import the First 
Circuit's standard as its own. 
In Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski,7 the court restated and emphasized 
its "general wariness of adoptive admissions."8 The defendant was 
charged with the murder of his wife in a wooded roadside area. His ex-
planation to police and testimony at trial was that he and his wife had 
been kidnapped and attacked by two assailants intending to rob them; 
that his wife had been struck with an unknown instrument and that he 
had been beaten on the head with a stick. Police had found the defendant 
near the scene, received his story, and taken him to a hospital where 
an examining physician answered police, in Rembiszewski's presence, 
that x-rays revealed no head or facial injuries as claimed. The defendant 
remained silent. The episode came into evidence through the testimony 
of one of the officers. The court found its admission improper, but not 
materially harmful. It rejected the defendant's silence as an adoptive 
admission exception to the hearsay rule under these particular circum-
stances and under the general circumstance facing a defendant just 
given his Miranda warning of his right to remain silent. For an arrested 
and duly warned defendant, then, an adoptive admission by silence is 
practically impossible. 
The Appeals Court, in Commonwealth v. Deschamps,9 was similarly 
cautious of a defendant's inferential apology to the victim of rape and 
unnatural and lascivious acts. The victim's testimony of the defendant's 
subsequent account of his hard childhood, including time in reform 
schools, was sustained for its probative value as an implied apology for 
his coercion of the victim into acts of intercourse, fellatio, and cunni-
lingus. The Appeals Court characterized the apology as more probative 
as an admission of the forcible behavior constituting the crimes charged 
than prejudicial as a suggestion of past crimes. The court still relied 
upon a narrowing jury instruction to this effect as a safeguard against 
error. 
§2.4. Discovery and use of exculpatory evidence. Two decisions of 
the Supreme Judicial Court and one of the federal district court involved 
the discovery and use of exculpatory evidence. In Commonwealth v. 
Masskow,1 where the defendant's sanity was in issue, the court rejected 
the defendant's contention that evidence was suppressed by the prose-
7 1973 Mass Adv. Sh. 461, 293 N.E.2d 919. 
8 Id. at 465, 293 N.E.2d at 923. 
9 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1, 29! N.E.2d 426. 
§2.4. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1817, 290 N.E.2d 154 (discussed supra, §2.2). 
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cution's failure to volunteer a prosecutor's psychiatrist's report reaching 
an opinion of criminal irresponsibility. The court was not satisfied that 
two of the three necessary criteria were present: first, while the omitted 
evidence may have been favorable to the defense, second, it had not in 
fact been suppressed after a request by the defense, and third, most 
tellingly, it would not have added "material" evidence since it merely 
corroborated the opinions of the only two testifying psychiatrists that the 
defendant was not responsible.2 While the rules of evidence were not mis-
applied in this case, the resulting conviction of second degree murder is 
nonetheless remarkable in light of the three psychiatrists' unanimous 
opinion of the defendant's criminal irresponsibility. The court declined 
to set aside the verdict under its broader powers to prevent a miscarriage 
of justice since the charge was accurate, and since a psychiatric opinion 
on the issue of insanity is not conclusive by itsel£.3 
In Commonwealth v. Clark,4 the co-defendant charged with second 
degree murder assigned as error the trial court's denial of a motion to 
direct the prosecution to provide the criminal records and probation 
records of its witnesses. The court spelled out the defendant's rights 
with respect to such material: 
While it is clear that the defendant is entitled to the names of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses, and to access to criminal records under 
the direction of the court, in our view it is not required that the 
prosecution take affirmative steps in behalf of the defendants to 
collect their criminal records. This burden rests with the defen-
dants. Furthermore, there is no general pre-trial right to see proba-
tion records of witnesses.5 
In United States v. Mello,6 the defendant, convicted of possession of 
goods stolen from an interstate railroad shipment, was denied a new trial 
because additional evidence corroborating his explanation in defense 
had been available at trial and culpably overlooked. In these circum-
stances the court felt it had no discretion to grant a new trial. 
§2.5. Grand jury evidence. Two decisions, one from the Supreme 
Judicial Court and the other from the federal district court, dealt with 
access to grand jury evidence on the part of the defendant and the gov-
ernment, respectively. The first illustrates the defendant's qualified right 
to grand jury minutes and the second shows the government's qualified 
power to compel grand jury testimony. 
In Commonwealth v. Flynn,! two co-defendants moved for permission 
2 Id. at 1824, 290 N.E.2d at 158. 
3 Id. at 1825, 290 N.E.2d at 159. 
4 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 6!17, 295 N.E.2d 163. 
II Id. at 642, 295 N.E.2d at 167-68. 
6 469 F .2d !156 (1st Cir. 1972). 
§2.5. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1579, 287 N.E.2d 420. 
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to use the transcript of grand jury testimony by an accomplice who had 
turned state's evidence. The court permitted counsel two hours to read 
the thirty-four page transcript, but denied their request for separate 
permanent copies. The court upheld the denial and reemphasized that 
defendants remain unentitled to individual copies of minutes as of 
right. :I 
In re Alperens involved a motion by the government to hold a hus-
band and wife in civil contempt for ongoing refusal to answer questions 
before a special grand jury on grounds of the husband-wife privilege. 
The rourt gave short shrift to the claim of interspousal privilege on multi-
ple grounds of (1) the adequacy of a grant of transactional immunity to 
each; (2) the improbability of inculpatory evidence against either; (3) 
the government's avowed disinterest in such evidence; (4) and the avail-
ability of a subsequent motion to suppress. Affirming per curiam, the 
First Circuit stated simply that the statutory grant of transactional im-
munity was sufficient.' 
§2.6. Conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Flynn,l mentioned above at 
§2.5. presented the Supreme Judicial Court with an appeal from the 
conviction of four defendants charged with coordinated acts of breaking 
and entering and of armed robbery of twenty-four victims engaged in 
gambling in the basement of a social club. The most significant eviden-
tiary point of the decision is its reaffirmation and extension of the two 
stages with which the court allows for the development of evidence in 
conspiracy trials: 
"by allowing in the first instance as against each defendant sep-
arately evidence of such acts, knowledge and admissions as appear 
to affect the particular defendant and then, when sufficient evidence 
has accumulated to support a fair inference of the existence of a 
conspiracy, by removing the limitation, so that evidence of the acts, 
knowledge and admissions of all who are found to have joined in 
the conspiracy, during the course of and in pursuance of the con-
spiracy, becomes applicable against all the conspirators."2 
2 The court cited Commonwealth v. De Christoforo, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1707, 277 
N.E.2d 100, which confirms the rule requiring a defendant to show a "particularized 
need" to inspect the minutes. For critical analysis of this standard, see 1972 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law 1§7.7 and 12.4. 
Also, one defendant who wished to challenge inconsistencies and contradictions on 
cross-examination was permitted to confront the witness with the transcript after the 
trial judge examined the passages in question. 
8 !155 F. Supp.ll72 (D. Mass. 197!1). 
4 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 197!1). 
§2.6. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1579, 287 N.E.2d 420. 
2 Id. at 1598, 287 N.E.2d at 4!16, quoting Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 
lll2-llll, 194 N.E. 905, 909 (19!15). 
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The court extended this rule of evidence "to cases where a conspiracy 
or common enterprise is shown to exist even though not charged,''8 on 
the underlying principle that each co-venturer is agent for the others in 
furtherance of the common object. Consequently, the trial judge here 
did not err in removing the limitation on evidence at an appropriate 
point, even though conspiracy was not formally charged. 
§2.7. Sexually dangerous persons. Perhaps the court's most defini-
tive evidentiary decision of the Survey year was its statement of evi-
dence admissible in a proceeding to commit an individual as a sexually 
dangerous person. Section 6 of chapter 128A authorizes the petition to 
commit; sections 4 and 5 deal with the sources and admissibility of 
evidence. 
In the case of Commonwealth v. Bladsa,l two psychiatrists, as witnesses 
for the Commonwealth, rendered opinions that the defendant was sex-
ually dangerous. They testified in detail as to numerous sex offenses, 
all of which information they had obtained from police reports and from 
"the official police version." The court held this testimony inadmissible 
hearsay lacking any statutory authorization. Since the trial judge had 
based his conclusion of commitment at least in part on the testimony, 
the error was held harmful and the commitment improper. 
With special regard to the statutory provisions, the court construed 
section 4 as allowing examining psychiatrists only access to court records 
and certain described probation records and not as authorizing the ad-
missibility of such records, and section 5 as authorizing the admissibility 
only of past criminal and psychiatric records of the defendant and any 
psychiatric report prepared for the commitment procedure: 
We conclude that the only evidence which is rendered admissible 
by the terms of G. L. c. 128A §§4, 5 and 6, is that described in § 5, 
viz: past criminal and psychiatric records of the defendant, and any 
psychiatric report filed under c. 128A.2 
Psychiatrists, then, may not import other material into their testimony. 
In addition, the bases of psychiatric reports and opinions offered under 
chapter 128A are likely to be more rigorously tested for hearsay origins. 
While section 4 material may serve as clues for the direction of psychiatric 
investigation, the upshot of the decision is that psychiatric conclusions 
must rest on the independent process of the investigation itself. 
§2.8. Expert opinion. In Commonwealth v. Harris,1 the Appeals 
Court provided a thorough-going analysis of the use of expert opinion. 
s 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1598, 287 N.E.2d at 4!16. 
§2.7. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1675, 288 N.E.2d Sill. 
2 Id. at 1676, 288 N.E.2d at 814. 
§2.8. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. !107, 295 N.E.2d 687. 
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The defendant had been found guilty of arson and of breaking and 
entering in the nighttime to commit arson. The trial judge had allowed 
the expert opinion of an officer of the Boston Fire Department's arson 
investigation squad to the effect that two independent fires had been set 
at the arson site. As the basis for these opinions, the expert testified that 
he had made a personal, three-hour investigation of the scene and found 
positive evidence of two distinct fires, and that he had found no satis-
factory alternative explanation for two simultaneous and independent 
fires, other than that they had been set. The court upheld the admission 
of these opinions against several contentions. The expert opinion was 
appropriate: (1) because the subject matter need only be one "'about 
which special knowledge beyond that possessed by the ordinary juryman 
will aid the jury in their deliberations .. .' ";2 (2) because the opinion 
was based upon personal independent investigation, and not merely in-
formation from other sources; (3) because the expert did not usurp the 
function of ultimate factfinding from the jury so long as the basis of 
his opinion had been thoroughly examined and tested for his judgment; 
and (4) because an opinion based on an elimination of alternative possi-
bilities does not reduce to mere conjecture so long as the elimination of 
alternatives . is systematic. These criteria are instructive generally and 
authoritative particularly for the prosecution and defense of arson. 
§2.9. Photographic evidence. In Commonwealth v. Chalifoux,t the 
defendant, charged with holding his erstwhile girl friend overnight and 
beating her with a metal club, was convicted of kidnapping, uttering a 
threat to kill, and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Several 
days after these events, the victim, at the suggestion of the police, had a 
friend take colored photographs of the multiple bruises which covered 
her body. On the same day a police matron examined her and took note 
of the bruises. The defendant appealed from the subsequent admission 
of the photographs at trial. The court's decision illustrates the usual con-
siderations and the common result attending the issue of photographic 
evidence. Typically, as here, the defendant contends that the photographs 
are merely cumulative or redundant of oral testimony and that their prej-
udicial or inflammatory impact upon the jury outweighs any probative 
value. In response the prosecution stresses their relevance to an element 
of a substantive crime, here assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, 
and argues that the balance struck between evidential value and prejudice 
was not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. In deciding, courts most 
often hold, as was held in this case, the photographic evidence will stand 
(1) because the government is entitled to prove and corroborate its case 
2 Id. at !109, 295 N.E.2d at 690, quoting Lovasw v. Parkhurst Marine Ry., !122 Mass. 
64, 67, 75 N.E.2d 924, 925 (1947). 
§2.9. 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 9!1, 291 N.E.2d 6!15. 
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more effectively or graphically than by mere oral testimony; (2) because 
the photographs will usually substantiate an element of an offense or 
refute a defense, here, for example, the contention that the victim had 
merely fallen down; (3) because the trial judge may curb prejudicial 
effect by instructions on the weight of the pictures; and (4) because as 
a matter of experience, the occasions for exclusion for prejudice "have 
be~n rare indeed,"2 and seem likely to continue to be so. 
§2.10. Burdens of proof. Two of the year's decisions clarify the 
allocation of burdens of proof, one with regard to the defense of an 
alibi, the other with regard to the offense of rape. 
In Commonwealth v. Leaster,1 discussed in §2.2 under the subject of 
criminal identification evidence, the defendant introduced an alibi de-
fense, to the effect that he was at home, which defense was corroborated 
by a friend. The defendant appealed on the grounds that the charge 
on this point suggested to the jury an option to ignore the Common-
wealth's burden to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
instruction was sustained. Its caveat that alibi evidence must be scruti-
nized carefully was coupled with a reminder that the Commonwealth 
retained the burden of proving every essential element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable. doubt. There was no language burdening the de-
fendant with proof of his alibi or thereby implying that the prosecution 
was relieved of its usual burden in the event of his failure to prove the 
alibi. 
In Commonwealth v. McKay,2 the defendant, convicted of assault with 
intent to rape, challenged the admission of evidence of the victim's 
virginity as part of the government's case in chief when the victim's 
consent and reputation for chastity had not been questioned by the 
defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court suggested that by itself such 
evidence would be gratuitous, prejudicial, and reversible error: 
Better practice would call for the introduction by the prosecution 
of any evidence concerning the witness's virginity only after the 
question of her consent had been raised on cross-examination, by 
the defendant's testimony or otherwise.a 
Ironically, here, the error was retroactively cured by the defendant's sub-
sequent introduction of the consent issue. In the future, however, the 
government may risk error by anticipation of the defense of consent. 
Though admitting evidence of virginity, the court took pains to 
defend as rationally distinguishable its common law rule excluding evi-
dence of specific prior events of intercourse. The two rules rest on 
2 Id. at 98, 291 N.E.2d at 6!19. 
§2.10. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 15!1!1, 287 N.E.2d 122. 
2 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. !17!1, 294 N.E.2d 21!1. 
a Id. at !177, 294 N.E.2d at 217. 
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divergent ratios of proof to prejudice. Evidence of virginity is more 
probative of a victim's disinclination to consent than it is prejudicial 
to the defendant; evidence of previous intercourse is less probative of the 
victim's consent than it is prejudicial to her. Still, in one final refine-
ment, the court noted that the defendant may introduce evidence of 
past intercourse to controvert evidence of virginity which the govern-
ment has introduced against the defense of consent. 
II. CIVIL EVIDENCE 
§2.ll. Administrative proceedings. In Western Massachusetts Bus 
Lines, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities,1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed a general policy allowing agencies like the Department 
of Public Utilities (DPU) "wide latitude in the admission of evidence"2 
and it reaffirmed the particular evidentiary rule that " an administrative 
decision may be sustained if it is based on hearsay supported and cor-
roborated by competent legal evidence."s 
In this instance a petitioning bus proprietor had applied to the DPU 
for a license to engage in charter service for trips originating within the 
town of Easthampton. Western Massachusetts Bus Lines had been 
allowed to intervene in opposition. At a public hearing the applicant 
testified that members of various Easthampton civic groups had expressed 
an interest in bus service for elderly people and youth groups and had 
signed supportive petitions. The applicant offered the petitions, which 
the hearing examiner excluded from evidence but retained in the file 
for the DPU's discretionary use. The subsequent DPU findings relied, at 
least in part, on the excluded petitions. The intervenor urged that re-
liance on unsworn hearsay statements constituted reversible error. Re-
jecting that contention, the court reasoned that the applicant's testimony 
of various civic groups' attitudes, which was competent legal evidence, 
supplied the support necessary for the hearsay petitions. 
§2.12: Personal injury evidence. The Survey year generated three 
notable opinions dealing, respectively, with (1) the admissibility of of-
ficial weather reports, (2) the admissibility of police reports, and (3) the 
prima facie requirements for the foreign-substance species of the so-called 
"fall-down" case. 
In Crowe v. Ward,l the dispositive question was the admission of the 
official weather report compiled seven and one-quarter miles away at 
Logan Airport on the day when the plaintiff's motor scooter collided 
§2.11. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 205, 292 N.E.2d 707. 
2 Id. at 207, 292 N.E.2d at 709. 
aId. 
§2.12. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 231, 292 N.E.2d 716. 
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with the defendant's car. The plaintiff had claimed that the day was 
clear and dry; the defendant that it had been raining and that the pave-
ment had been wet. The report's contents documented a clear, dry day. 
It had been excluded, and there had been a verdict for the defendant. 
The court held the exclusion to be reversible error and reasoned that it 
should have been admitted for the jury's common sense appraisal of 
proper speed under the circumstances. After canvassing the authorities 
in other jurisdictions, the court suggested that, whenever such reports 
are possibly relevant to conditions at the accident site, the better part 
of the trial judge's discretion is to admit them and leave their weight to 
the jury after any contradiction or cautionary instruction. 
In Kelly v. O'Neil,2 the Appeals Court overturned a verdict for per-
sonal and property damage suffered by the plaintiff as the result of a 
collision with the defendant's vehicle. There was conflicting evidence as 
to whether the defendant was driving under the influence of liquor and 
whether his headlights were on during the rainy night in question. The 
trial judge had admitted into evidence (1) a police officer's accident re-
port containing conclusions ("operating under the influence", "operating 
without a license in possession") drawn from his own observations on 
the night of the accident and from the statements made to him by others 
in the course of his investigation; and (2) a plaintiff's accident report filed 
with the local police and containing the statement that defendant's lights 
were not on and that "he was in my opinion, under the influence of 
liquor."a 
The trial judge admitted the officer's report apparently as a record 
made in the ordinary course of business under G.L c. 233, §78, or as an 
official written statement under G.L. c. 90, §29. The Appeals Court 
found neither statutory exception to the hearsay rule applicable. The 
officer himself testified and therefore should have been limited to testi-
mony of his own observations without the report. As to the second-level 
hearsay of others' statements, the court as a rule of first impression 
adopted its exclusion as the "better reasoned" policy in other jurisdic-
tions.• With regard to G.L. c. 90, §29, the exclusion of second-level 
hearsay was already the rule of Massachusetts decisions. The court 
applied the same reasoning to the plaintiff's accident report with special 
emphasis on the fact that by no stretch could the plaintiff have made 
this record in the course of any regular business in which she was en-
gaged. The fact that the police department maintained such reports on 
file in the regular course of its business was held not material.G 
2 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 561, 296 N.E.2d 225. 
a Id. at 566, 296 N.E.2d at 227. 
4. Id. at 564, 296 N.E.2d at 225-26. 
G Id. at 566, 296 N.E.2d at 227. The Appeals Court also rejected as an adoptive 
admission testimony of the offirer that the defendant did not respond to an accusation 
of drunkenness by an unidentified third person at the accident scene, citing Common-
13
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Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority6 is an instruc-
tive opinion. The plaintiff had slipped on a dirty, muddy hard substance 
and fallen down the remainder of an MBT A station staircase. Despite 
the fact that the substance had never been identified, the plaintiff won 
a verdict. The issue on appeal became the quality of evidence necessary 
to warrant an inference that the substance had existed for such a period 
of time that it should have been discovered and removed by the de-
fendant. 
Justice Hennessey organized the successful plaintiff's cases into three 
classes: first, those where the peculiar character or description of the sub-
stance supported an inference that the defendant or its employees either 
created or had actual knowledge of the condition; second, those involving 
particularly favorable evidence of the proximate location of defendant's 
employees or their duty stations; and third, those involving organic mat-
ter the condition or color of which permitted an inference of duration. 
The present case lacked evidence to satisfy any of these criteria, and 
judgment for the defendant was therefore required. 
§2.13. Hearsay exceptions. In M. S. Walker, Inc. v. Travelers In-
demnity Co.,1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, looking to the proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence, expanded the common law hearsay ex-
ception of a declaration against interest by an unavailable witness. The 
plaintiff distiller sought over $151,000 from its insurer under a blanket 
crime coverage policy. Four of the distiller's former employees had 
previously signed statements detailing thefts and admitting complicity, 
then avoided subpoenas issued to compel their testimony. The trial 
judge had excluded the signed statements as hearsay. Relying upon pro-
posed Federal Rule 8042 and avoiding the older, restrictive Massachusetts 
wealth v. Rembiszewski, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 461, 29!J N.E.2d 919, discussed supra, §2.3 
and adopting the Supreme Judicial Court's sceptical attitude towards this hearsay 
exception. 
e 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 319, 292 N.E.2d 863. 
§2.1!1. 1 470 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 197!1). 
2 Rule 804, entitled "Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable" defines "unavail-
ability'' in subsection (a) and enumerates hearsay exceptions for an unavailable declarant 
in subsection (b). Pertinent here were the following provisions: 
(a) Definition of Unavailability.-"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations 
in which the declarant: 
(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been 
unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means. 
(b) Hearsa'J Exceptions.-The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(4) Statement against Interest.-A statement which was at the time of its making 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/5
§2.15 EVIDENCE 61 
definition of a witness's "unavailability," the court found the written 
admissions certainly "against interest" and the writers' evasion of sub-
poenas sufficient unavailability. Old decisions disqualifying criminal 
confessions, or requiring an adverse property interest, or limiting un-
availability to death were viewed as obsolete. The exclusion of the 
written statements therefore required a new trial. 
§2.14. Massachusetts evidentiary statutes. Chapter 149 of the Acts 
of 1973 expedites the admission and affirms the weight of certain state 
laboratory reports of lead content. It adds the following sentence to 
G.L. c. 111, §195:1 
A copy of the report of said laboratory or any division thereof, 
certified as a true copy by the custodian of the records of said lab-
oratory, shall be admissible in any judicial proceeding without fur. 
ther authentication by either the laboratory or by the agency for 
which said report was made and shall be prima facie evidence of 
the facts stated therein. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§2.15. Loss of bailed goods by fire: Shifting of the burden of proof 
to the bailee: Knowles v. Gilchrist Co.1 Pursuant to an agreement to 
reupholster and return certain articles of her furniture,2 the plaintiff· 
bailor, Mary Knowles, delivered the items to Gilchrist's Department 
Store (Gilchrist's).B The following day, a fire in Gilchrist's warehouse 
tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability • • • that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true .••• 
84 LEd. 2d at clxxvi-vii. 
§2.14. 1 Section 195 currently orders the Commissioner of Public Health to establish, 
within the Bureau of Institute of Laboratories, a state laboratory specifically to analyze 
specimens, samples and tests for lead poisoning. 
§2.15. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 178!1, 289 N.E.2d 879. 
2 The bailment contract in this case was typical of such agreements. The furniture 
to be reupholstered included one French Provincial divan, two chairs and one otto-
man. The stipulated cost to Mrs. Knowles was $5!15.60, of which a deposit of $100 
had been paid at the signing of the agreement; the balance was to be paid upon 
completion and redelivery, six to eight weeks later. Report of Defendant to Appellate 
Division of the District Courts, Northern District; Knowles v. Gilchrist's Department 
Store, No. 7642 [hereinafter cited as Report of Defendant]; Brief for Appellant, 
Appendix "C", at ii, Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 178!1, 289 N.E.2d 
879 [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. 
It is merely noted that the bailment contract contained an express disclaimer of 
liability for negligence, but this fact was never raised by either party. 
a The items were, in fact, transported from Mrs. Knowles's home to Gilchrist's by 
Dean Transportation Co., co-defendant at the district court level. Brief for Appellant, 
supra note 2, Appendix "C'', at ii. 
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destroyed the bailed furniture, thus preventing its return. In a bailment 
action brought both in contract and in tort, Mrs. Knowles sought to 
recover for the loss of her furniture by establishing a prima facie case of 
delivery and failure to return due to destruction by fire.4 Gilchrist's 
relied upon what it assumed to be Massachusetts law in arguing that the 
fact of loss by fire was a sufficient explanation for failure to return, which 
fact rebutted the prima facie case, and put the bailor to her proof on the 
issue of negligence. 
In the municipal court, there was a finding for Mrs. Knowles in the 
amount of $800 against Gilchrist's.li Upon a report claimed by the de-
fendant,6 the Appellate Division vacated the lower court ruling and 
found for Gilchrist's. The reversal was based upon Massachusetts deci-
sional law to the effect that the bailor bears the burden of proof by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence that the bailee breached its bailment 
contract by negligently caring for the goods.7 In the judgment of the 
court, the bailor had introduced no evidence to support a conclusion that 
the loss was due to the bailee's negligence, and the denial of the defen-
dant's requests for rulings was consequently deemed prejudicial error. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Tauro, 
reversed the order of the Appellate Division, remanded the case for a 
new trial,s and HELD: In all cases of bailment for hire, where the bailee 
has exclusive control of the possessions at the time of destruction or 
damage, once the bailor proves delivery of the property to the bailee in 
good condition and failure to redeliver on timely demand, the burden of 
proof is shifted to the bailee to show by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence that he has exercised due care to prevent the property's loss or 
destruction. e 
4 See note 61 infra, discussing the tactical implications of the plaintiff-bailor's having 
presented the fact of destruction by fire as an element of her case. 
li 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178!1, 289 N.E.2d at 880. The municipal court found for the 
co-defendant, Dean Transportation Co. Id. at 178!1 n.l, 289 N.E.2d at 880 n.l. 
6 The report was claimed on the refusal by the trial judge to allow the following 
requests for rulings: 
(1) On all the evidence a finding for the bailee is required. (2) On all the law, 
a finding for the bailee is required •••• (7) The evidence is insufficient to warrant 
a finding for the bailor as to the extent of her damages. 
Id. at 178!1, 289 N.E.2d at 880. The court allowed request (!1): "On all the evidence a 
ruling for the defendant is warranted," but it ruled that the court did not so find. 
Report of Defendant, supra note 2, at iii. 
1 Opinion, Appellate Division of the District Courts, Northern District; Knowles v. 
Gilchrist's Department Store, No. 7642 [hereinafter cited as Appellate Opinion]; Brief 
for Appellant, supra note 2, Appendix "D", at ii, citing Bean v. Security Fur Storage 
Warehouse, Inc., !144 Mass. 674, 677, 184 N.E.2d 64, 66 (1962). See text at note 89 infra. 
8 J. Braucher dissented in part, on this point. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1792, 289 
N.E.2d at 885. See note 62 infra and accompanying text. 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1792, 289 N.E.2d at 885. The court took pains to limit the 
holding expressly to a "specific rule for a specific class of cases, bailment for hire." Id. 
at 1791 n.4, 289 N.E.2d at 884 n.4. 
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Rejecting what it termed as the long-abandoned notion of strict ad-
herence to pleadings, the court espoused the policy of allocating the 
burden of proof on the basis of fairness to the parties. The justices also 
relied upon a doctrine found in many cases where negligence is an issue, 
that the burden of proof often rests with the party "peculiarly in the 
knowledge" of facts; they concluded that it was clear that a bailee has 
"greater access to the information needed to show negligence or due 
care."10 The court further pointed to the fact that whereas placing the 
ultimate burden of proof of negligence on bailors was unfair in itself, 
this situation was even more pronounced when the bailor in a particular 
case happened to be a consumer. It was observed that unfamiliarity with 
commercial trade practices and customs too often compounded the diffi-
culty of the consumer-bailor's task of carrying the burden of proof of 
negligence.u 
The Knowles case is significant both for its result and for the reasoning 
behind the decision, particularly with regard to the court's examination 
of Massachusetts bailment law as it stood prior to this new rule. In the 
past, bailment cases of this nature were most often disposed of as a matter 
of law.12 However, under the decision in Knowles, the trier of fact will 
always determine a contested issue of negligence. The newly promulgated 
Knowles rule holds that in actions brought in either contract or tort, 
where the bailor makes out a prima facie case-a showing of delivery and 
failure to return on timely demand-the bailee is saddled with the 
burden of pleading and proving due care as an affirmative defense.13 
Also excluded from this new rule were cases where the bailee has contractually 
obligated himself irrespective of due care. Id. at 1792, 289 N.E.2d at 885. However, 
where there has been an agreement to the effect that liability is not to be predicated 
upon fault-but, for example, upon the existence and validity of the contract itself-
negligence will not be an issue at trial; the Knowles rule would seem to be irrelevant 
on its face. For further discussion, see text at notes 117-19 infra. 
10 Id. at 1791,289 N.E.2d at 884. 
11 Id. at 1790, 289 N.E.2d at 883-84. The court noted "that in a closely similar situ-
ation the Legislature long ago placed the burden of proof on the bailee." Id. at 1791, 
289 N.E.2d at 885. This rule applied only when a warehouse receipt was issued, and 
came under the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, G.L. c. 105, §§15, 27, inserted by 
Acts of 1907, c. 582, §§9, 22, later subsumed under the Uniform Commercial Code, as 
enacted in G.L. c. 106, §7-403(l)(b). 
12 According to the order of the Appellate Division in Knowles, the mere fact of a 
fire was in effect held to be a sufficient explanation for failure to deliver. Appellate 
Opinion, snpra note 7, at ii. Under this reasoning, if a bailor could produce no facts, 
other than the prima facie case, from which an inference of negligence could be drawn, 
the showing that the goods were lost in a fire or other extraordinary event would 
excuse the bailee's performance and absolve him from liability. It is suggested, see 
text following note 97 infra, that this was not the prevailing view in Massachusetts 
at the time of the Knowles decision. This view is contrary to the holding of the 
Appellate Division and the conjecture of the Supreme Judicial Court in the instant 
case. See 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1788, 289 N.E.2d at 882-83. 
13 Under ordinary rules of trial practice, an affirmative defense must be established 
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Accordingly, the bailee must now convince the finder of fact that it is 
more likely than not that he had exercised the proper standard of care 
owed as a "bailee for hire."14 A failure to sustain the burden of proof on 
this is'sue of due care by a fair preponderance of the evidence will result 
in a judgment for the bailor. 
In general, this note will consider the result reached by the court in 
the Knowles case in light of rules of evidence and prior Massachusetts 
law. In order to understand more completely the issues that were raised 
in the case, the first part of the note will review some fundamental con-
cepts of the law of evidence. Then, after an examination of a number of 
Massachusetts decisions, specifically those relating to allegations of bailee 
negligence, it will be submitted that, as suggested by Justice Braucher's 
dissenting opinion, the Knowles case could have been disposed of on the 
basis of precedent,111 and that the novel rule promulgated by the Supreme 
Judicial Court was not necessary to reach the desired result.16 However, 
notwithstanding the difficulties raised by some aspects of the court's 
opinion, particularly in relation to its interpretation of and reliance upon 
past decisions, it will be concluded that the Knowles rule appears to be a 
fair and equitable solution to the problems encountered by a bailor in 
proving bailee negligence. 
I. SOME PRELIMINARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 
In Massachusetts,17 as in most other jurisdictions, the burden of proof 
is comprised of two distinct elements, the burden of production1s and the 
by the party asserting it. See, e.g., R. Brown, Personal Property §87, at 37!1 (2d ed. 
1955). Aa the matter will be discussed in regard to prior Massachusetts cases, an affirma-
tive defense· is a "confession and avoidance" of the proponent's assertions. It is an 
admission that the event transpired, but sets up new matter to avoid the effect of the 
allegation if established. See notes 6!1-70 infra and accompanying text. 
14 A bailee for hire is bound to exercise that degree of care concerning the article 
bailed which under the circumstances a reasonably careful man would use with ref-
erence to his own property of a similar nature. Rourke v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 
268 Mass. 7, 8, 167 N.E. 2!11, 2!12 (1929). The greater the value of the article bailed, the 
greater should be the vigilance of the bailee. Morse v. Homer's, Inc., 295 Mass. 606, 
609,4 N.E.2d 625, 627 (19!16). 
1li More specifically, Bean v. Security Fur Storage Warehouse, Inc., M4 Mass. 674, 
184 N.E.2d 64 (1962). See note 62 infra and text at note 94 infra. 
16 This "novelty" is exemplified by statements in such cases as Hanna v. Shaw, 244 
Mass. 57, 60, 1!18 N.E. 247, 248 (192!1) (disapproved of in Bean v. Security Fur Storage 
Warehouse, Inc., 544 Mass. 674, 676, 184 N.E.2d 64, 66 (1962)); Wylie v. Marinofsky, 
201 Mass. 58!1, 584, 88 N.E. 448, 449 (1909) (espousing the general rule that the burden 
of persuasion never shifts). See W. Leach Be P. Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts 
Evidence 47, 5!1 (4th ed. 1967). The latter material may also be found in Leach Be 
Liacos, Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 52 Mass. LQ. 117 (1967). 
lT See, e.g., Powers v. Russell, !10 Mass. 69, 76 (1832); City of Lawrence v. Commis-
sioners of Public Works, !118 Mass. 520, 527-28, 62 N.E.2d 850, 854 (1945). See also 
W. Leach Be P. Liacos, supra note 16, at 41. 
18 The burden of production is also known as the burden of going forward with the 
evidence. 
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burden of persuasion.19 The burden of production is the preliminary 
burden of persuading the judge that a jury could reasonably conclude 
that a certain fact exists.20 The burden of production is sustained when 
the proponent has introduced sufficient evidence: first, to have the issue 
presented to the jury and thus escape a directed verdict;21 and, second, 
to sustain a favorable finding by the jury upon subsequent review by the 
trial judge or on appeal.22 The burden of persuasion is the burden of 
convincing the jury (or the judge in his capacity as the finder of fact) that 
the alleged fact is true.23 In a normal civil case, the fact-finder must 
believe that the proponent's contention is more probable than not; in 
other words, the fact-finder must be convinced by a fair preponderance of 
the evidence.24 Although a mathematical preponderance is not viewed as 
a favored method of determination,211 it is clear that the trier must be 
persuaded by the evidence that it is at least fifty-one percent probable 
that the proposed fact is true. 
An inference is a deduction, a result of the application of rules of logic, 
whereby a certain amount of legal force is derived from the essential 
probative worth of "basic facts" offered by the proponent.26 An infer-
ence may be drawn only where the trier of fact has been convinced by the 
balance of reason that proof of the basic fact A logically permits the 
finding of fact B.2T An inference is permissive in the sense that proof of 
fact A does not require the finding of fact B; in other words, if the basic 
fact A is established, the trier is merely permitted to infer the existence 
of fact B. It is essential to note, therefore, that an inference, once drawn, 
will always present a question of fact for the trier, and is thereby more 
durable than a true presumption. 
A presumption, on the other hand, is a procedural device that assists 
a party in meeting his burden of production by requiring a finding of 
fact B once the basic fact A has been proved.28 Policy considerations 
rather than logic are the moving force behind the development and use 
of these rules.29 Unlike an inference, a presumption requires a finding of 
19 The burden of persuasion is also known as the risk of non-persuasion and, simply 
but imprecisely, the burden of proof. 
20 C. McCormick, Evidence §!l!l6,'at 78!1 (2d ed. 1972). 
21 F. James, Jr., Civil Procedure 252-5!1 (1965). C. McCormick, supra note 20, §3!16, 
at 784. 
22 W. Leach 8c P. Liacos, supra note 16, at 47-48. 
23 C. McCormick, supra note 20, §!136, at 784-85. 
24 W. Leach 8c P. Liacos, supra note 16, at 42-4!1. 
211 Id. at 42. 
26 Cf. J. Maguire, J. Weinstein, J. Chadbourn, J. Mansfield, Evidence: Cases and 
Materials 1046 (6th ed. 197!1) (hereinafter cited as J. Maguire]. The term is sometimes 
used interchangeably with "permissive or permissible inference," "presumption of 
fact,'' and even "presumption" itself. Understandably, confusion has been promoted 
and perpetuated by such imprecision and lack of consistency. · 
27 W. Leach 8c P. Liacos, supra note 16, at 62. 
28 J. Maguire, supra note 26, at 1046-47. 
29 One such policy is the attainment of a certain degree of uniformity by making 
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fact B in situations where the basic fact A is established and there is no 
countervailing evidence as to the presumed fact B.80 A presumption is 
merely a procedural rule about evidence, and is not itself considered 
evidence.81 It is ordinarily rebuttable by the introduction of relevant 
evidence by the opponent that warrants a finding contrary to the pre-
sumed fact.a2 If a presumption is successfully rebutted, it will lose its 
artificial compelling force. Nonetheless, where that presumption has 
arisen from the existence of certain basic facts having probative value-
in contradistinction to one imposed by rule of the common law or by 
statute-those facts still retain their inherent probative worth, and thus 
provide an independent evidentiary value to be assessed by the trier.83 If 
and when the compelling force of the presumption has "disappeared," 
the issue is then submitted to the trier to determine whether or not the 
probative value of the basic facts underlying the presumption is such 
that an inference may reasonably be drawn. In conclusion, it can be said 
that the most significant procedural effect of a presumption is that it 
shifts to the opponent the burden of producing evidence to rebut the 
presumed £act.B4 · 
Prima facie evidence is a term having special meaning in this jurisdic-
tion. Essentially, prima facie evidence is a presumption that is based upon 
mandatory the conclusion that is normally drawn from certain facts; in a sense, then, 
logic is not totally absent,as a consideration. Presumptions are also employed to bring 
about a particular substantive re8ult, rather than merely to normalize probabilities. 
This type of presumption has been referred to as a "smoking out" presumption, 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §38, at 210 (4th ed. 1971). Other of these 
underlying policies include: general fairness to parties, procedural convenience, su-
perior access to information, and the handicapping of a disfavored contention. See 
C. McCormick, supra note 20, §!14!1, at 806. 
80 W. Leach 8c P. Liacos, supra note 16, at 5!1, citing Epstein v. Boston Housing 
Authority, !117 Mass. 297, 58 N.E.2d 1!15 (1944). 
81 Perry v. Boston Eleyated Ry., !122 Mass. 206, 209, 76 N.E.2d 65!1, 655 (1948). 
Contra, Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 559, 299 P. 529, 5!17 (19!11). But see 
McBaine, Burden of Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. Ill, 21 (1954). 
82 Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., llll7 Mass. !112, !116, 149 N.E.2d 6!15, 6!19 (1958). 
Wigmore explains that "the presumption is not the fact itself, nor the inference itself, 
but the legal consequences attached to it." 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2491, at 288 (lid ed. 
1940). 
83 In the words of Professor Thayer, when the opponent comes forward with 
evidence, 
[a]ll is then turned into an ordinary question of evidence, and the ••• facts 
presupposed in the rule of presumption take their place with the rest, and operate, 
with their own natural force, as a part of the total mass of probative matter. 
]. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at. the Common Law M6 (1898). It 
should be noted that Professor Thayer suggested that a presumption was effectively 
rebutted upon the introduction of any evidence by the opposing party. See text at 
note ll9 infra. See also W. Prosser, supra note 29, §38, at 210. 
84 Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, !117 Mass. 2!11, !102, 58 N.E.2d 1!15, 1!19 
(1944). See also W. Leach 8c P. Liacos, supra note 16, at 5!1-54; 9 J. Wigmore, supra 
note !12, §2491, at 288; J. Maguire, supra note 26, at 1046. 
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logical probabilities.811 It exhibits the artificial compelling force of a true 
presumption, while at the same time is founded upon underlying facts 
having sufficient probative worth that an inference will be warranted in 
every instance. Therefore, prima facie evidence is the sum total of a pre-
sumption and an inference.se For example, if the opponent comes for-
ward to rebut prima facie evidence with a showing sufficient to warrant a 
finding contrary to the presumed fact, the artificial and compelling force 
"disappears." However, since the basic facts underlying the prima facie 
evidence have sufficient probative worth to give rise to an inference, this 
evidence will always remain viable and will present a question of fact in 
every case.8'l 
In those cases where either a presumption or prima facie evidence is 
operating, the issue invariably presented has been one of the quality and 
quantity of evidence that is necessary to rebut the artificial and com-
pelling effect of the presumption or prima facie evidence. This inquiry 
presents an issue of debate that is hardly settled in the law.ss The pivotal 
question has been whether the evidence offered by . the opponent must 
have a certain degree of probative weight before the artificial effect of 
the presumption is rebutted, or whether any eviden.c:e whatsoever on the 
presumed fact will cause the compelling force to "disappear." The con-
cept of a disappearing presumption was first propounded by Professor 
Thayer in his book, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence.119 It was sug-
gested therein that since a presumption was merely a rule about evidence, 
which was devised ostensibly to shift the burden of production to the 
opponent, the introduction by the opponent of any evidence relating to 
the presumed fact would rebut the artificial and compelling force of the 
rule."' If the underlying facts that remained had any probative value, 
the trier could then weigh and assess the evidence for conflicting prob-
abilities.41 
This theory of a disappearing presumption looked fine conceptually, 
illll W. Leach Be P. Liacos, supra note 16, at 53·55. 
ae Id. at 54. 
87 Hobart-Farrell Plumbing Be Heating Co. v. Klayman, !102 Mass. 508, 510, 19 
N.E.2d 805,807 (19lJ9). See text at note 46 supra. 
88 See, e.g., Hinds v. John Hancock Mot. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. M9, 155 A.2d 721 
(1959). 
89 J. Thayer, supra note lJlJ. 
40 Id. at M6; In Massachusetts, " '[p]resumptions are not indulged to supply the 
place of facts; they are never allowed against ascertained and established facts. When 
these appear, presumptions disappear.'" Duggan v. Bay State St. Ry., 230 Mass. lJ70, 
lJ78, 119 N.E. 757, 760 (1918), quoting Lincoln v. French, 105 U.S. 614, 617 (1881). It 
should be noted that Duggan incorrectly quoted Lincoln; the text should have read 
"presumptions are indulged ••• .'' [Emphasis added.] 
It is submitted that this strict Thayerian approach of a disappearing presumption 
has been modified subsequent to the Duggan case. See notes 46-52 infra and accom-
panying text. 
41 See note lJlJ supra. 
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but had produced some strange results in its application. For example, 
a substantial number of jurisdictions hold that a presumption of bailee 
negligence arises upon the bailor's making out a prima facie case of 
delivery in good condition and a failure or refusal to return the bailed 
article.42 In a jurisdiction adhering to the stri"ct Thayerian approach, this 
presumption of bailee negligence theoretically could be rebutted by the 
mere factual showing that the items bailed were destroyed by fire.43 Inas-
much as the fact of the conflagration would have been offered to rebut 
a presumption of the bailee's negligence, the fact of fire would essentially 
represent evidence of the bailee's due care; the absurdity of this result is 
apparent. After long-endured application of the doctrine and its variants, 
the occurrence of such "irrational results" prompted the displeasure of a 
number of writers. One spokesman, Professor Morgan, insisted: 
(I]t is little short of ridiculous to allow so valuable a presumption 
to be destroyed by the introduction of evidence without actual per-
suasive effect ...• 
The conclusion then is that most presumptions should . • • con-
tinue to operate unless and until the evidence persuades the trier at 
least that the non-existence of the presumed fact is as probable as its 
existence. 44 
Although the language is somewhat different, and the reasoning is not 
as directly persuasive, a line of Massachusetts decisions supports the 
contention that a presumption is not rebutted unless evidence is adduced 
sufficient to warrant a finding contrary to the presumed fact. For ex-
ample, in Hobart-Farrell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Klayman,4~'> one of 
the principal Massachusetts cases dealing with prima facie evidence, the 
court explained: 
[A]s soon as evidence is introduced that warrants a finding that the 
42 See R. Brown, supra note 13, §87, at 363-65; Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New 
York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104 (1941), cited in Knowles, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1787-89, 289 N.E.2d at 882·83. Such a presumption arises in Massachusetts. See 
Knowles, id. at 1787-89,289 N.E.2d at 882-83. See also note 92 infra. 
43 Technically, this result could occur only in a jurisdiction adhering to a rule that 
the mere fact of fire is evidence from which an inference of due care may be drawn, 
which inference is as persuasive as the inference of negligence that might also be drawn. 
Again, it is noted that this is the conclusion suggested by the Appellate Division in 
Knowles, but contrary to the thesis propounded in this note. See particularly the dis-
cussion of the Little case, in text following note 96 infra. 
44 Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. 
L. Rev. 59, 82·83 (1933). He further concluded that "in situations where a presumption 
owes its origin to an important social policy, it should operate to fix the burden of 
persuasion." Id. at 83 (emphasis added). It is noted that Professor Morgan was there 
speaking of presumptions generally, and not of the presumption of negligence in 
bailment cases directly. For a similar proposition, see C. McCormick, supra note 20, 
at 819·29. 
41S !102 Mass. 508, 19 N.E.2d 805 (19!19). 
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letter failed to reach its destination, the artificial compelling force 
of prima facie evidence disappears, and the evidence of non-delivery 
has to be weighed against the likelihood that the mail service was 
efficient in the particular instance, with no artificial weight on either 
side of the balance. That was the case here. The evidence presented a 
pure question of fact.46 
69 
In Hale v. Hale;17 the court actually indicated that it had engaged in the 
weighing of evidence: "The recitals ... could be contradicted but we are 
of opinion that the evidence fell far short of doing so . ... This did not 
rebut the presumption or inference of regularity raised by the certifi-
cate."48 Similarly, in the case of Iantosca v. Iantosca,49 it was held: 
The burden was on the petitioner to prove that the deed was ineffec-
tive to pass title and, although he testified that he never acknowl-
edged the deed, the judge could disbelieve him and find proper 
acknowledgement from the evidence of the certificate alone.rm 
Since a presumption will have no operative effect unless it assists the 
party bearing the burden of proof,111 and given the Massachusetts cases 
mentioned above, it seems fair and reasonable to conclude that the 
evidence offered to rebut the presumption in this jurisdiction must have 
sufficient probative value to warrant a finding contrary to the presumed 
fact-that the evidence must be not only credible, but actually believed 
by the trier of fact. 62 
This conclusion finds further support, by implication, from Professor 
Morgan in his Foreword to the Model Code of Evidence,113 where set out 
are the four main views on the question of what quantum of evidence 
46 Id. at 510, 19 N.E.2d at 807 (emphasis added). 
47 332 Mass. 329, 125 N.E.2d 142 (1955). 
48 Id. at 333, 125 N.E.2d at 144 (emphasis added). Of course, the implication here 
is that if the evidence is to be weighed, it must meet a certain standard of worthiness. 
Such weighing would not be indulged in if any evidence whatsoever would rebut the 
presumption. 
49 324 Mass. 316, 86 N.E.2d 59 (1949). 
ISO Id. at 321, 86 N.E.2d at 61 (emphasis added). Whether it was a presumption or an 
inference operating in Iantosca is discussed in the Hale case, 332 Mass. at 333, 125 
N.E.2d at 144. Another case of interest is Duarte v. Kavanagh, 340 Mass. 640, 641-42, 
165 N.E.2d 746, 747 (1960), where the court held that even in dealing with a presump-
tion created by statute, the presumption was rebuttable and, by implication, would 
continue to operate only until evidence had been introduced that would warrant a 
finding contrary to the presumed fact. 
lSl Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297, 302, 58 N.E.2d 135, 139 
(1944). 
112 324 Mass. at 321, 86 N.E.2d at 61. See text at note 49 supra. For a more extensive 
discussion of the question of what evidence is required to rebut a presumption, see 
Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 356-66, 155 A.2d 721, 727-31 
(1959). 
lS3 Model Code of Evidence 53-57 (1942). 
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is required to cause a presumption to disappear. The first is the pure 
Thayerian approach, whereby any evidence on the presumed fact will 
rebut that fact, whether or not the evidence is believed by the judge or 
jury. The second theory requires "substantial evidence," a somewhat 
indefinite quantum ranging from more than enough evidence to justify 
a finding, to that amount of proof that would always require a directed 
verdict. Third is the view that the evidence offered in rebuttal be of 
such a quantity am~ quality that. the finder is convinced that the non-
existence of the presumed fact is at least as probable as its existence. The 
fourth and final view suggests that the presumed fact is not rebutted 
until the trier is convinced that its nonexistence is more probable than 
its existence." It is submitted herein that prior to Knowles, Massachu-
setts decisional law adhered to the second view-that the evidence need 
be "substantial" and believed by the trier-but that the court in Knowles 
clearly adopted the fourth view as specifically pertaining to bailments 
for hire.llll 
II. BAILMENT LAw IN MASSACRUSE'ITS PRioR TO THE Knowles CASE 
Upon an examination of the opinion and the result in Knowles, it 
appears that the court promulgated a new rule that was not necessary on 
the basis of the facts of the instant case and decisional law in this juris-
diction.li6 It is submitted that prior to Knowles when a bailor made out a 
prima facie case in bailment-delivery in good condition and a failure 
to return-a presumption of negligence arose, allocating to the bailee 
the burden of production of evidence on the presumed fact of negligence. 
However, the bailor retained the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the 
issue of negligence by a fair preponderance of the evidence.IIT To rebut 
the presumption of negligence, the bailee was required to submit suffi-
cient evidence of the circumstances surrounding the failure to return so 
that the trier could reasonably conclude that it was as probable as not 
that he had exercised due care.ll8 Now, as a result of the decision in 
M See notes 121-26 infra and ac:x:ompanying text. 
1111 See generally text at notes 9-11 supra. 
116 This is not to suggest disagreement with the rule announced in Knowles. To the 
contrary, it is submitted herein that the result reached in Knowles was necessary to 
promote fairness to bailon. See text following note llll infra. 
liT Although it was not a common undentanding among practitionen that either a 
presumption or prima facie evidence of negligence arises upon completion of the prima 
facie bailment case, the ·Knowles court did state that at least a presumption arises. 
1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1787-88, 289 N.E.2d at 882, citing Bean v. Security Fur Storage 
Warehouse, Inc., !144 Mass. 674, 184 N.E.2d 64 (1962). See note 92 infra. 
118 To avoid confusion as to whether this statement is inconaistent with the previous 
assertion in text at notes 55-55 supra, it is noted that at this point the reference is to 
a presumption based upon probabilities-prima facie evidence-whereas above the 
reference was to a mere presumption. See note 76 infra. 
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Knowles, both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion 
are shifted to the bailee once the bailor makes out a prima facie case.59 
Since the bailee now bears the risk of non-persuasion on the issue of due 
care, his evidence must convince the trier that it was more probable than 
not that he had exercised due care in control of the bailed items.60 
The question of whether or not the shifting of the burden of persua-
sion was necessary to reach the desired result in the Knowles case turns 
on the legal significance of the fact that the bailed items were destroyed 
in a fire.61 The ultimate issue presented is whether the mere fact o,. 
destruction of the bailed items by a fire is sufficient explanation to rebut 
the presumption of negligence, and thus put the bailor to the task of 
establishing negligence by means of other evidence. It is submitted that 
the mere fact of fire should have been insufficient to rebut the presump-
tion of negligence, and that Gilchrist's thereby failed to sustain its 
burden of production.62 Thus, it was not altogether necessary to shift 
the burden of persuasion, and the Supreme Judicial Court could have 
reached the same result in the principal case by simply adhering to past 
precedent, as a review of the more important Massachusetts cases dis-
cussed in Knowles will indicate. 
In the case of Cass v. Boston & Lowell R.R.,63 the plaintiff-bailor 
brought an action in contract against a railroad as bailee to recover 
damages for property stolen from its warehouse. With a strong dissent by 
Justice Bigelow,64 the court held that in an action for breach of contract, 
59 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1792,289 N.E.2d at 885. 
60 Note that since the prima facie case stands as prima facie evidence of negligence, 
a fact issue will be presented to the trier even when the presumption underlying the 
prima facie evidence has been rebutted. 
61 The fact of the loss in a fire was conceded by the bailor. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1784 n.2, 289 N.E.2d at 880 n.2. However, Mrs. Knowles made a tactical error in so 
admitting to the loss of her furniture by reason of a fire. If Gilchrist's had been 
required to establish the fact of the loss on its own, it might have offered evidence 
from which the trier could have drawn an inference of negligence, over and above that 
inference'arising from the plaintiff's evidence (i.e., the prima facie case). In support of 
their cause of action in negligence, it appears that counsel for Mrs. Knowles felt 
compelled to show the existence of the fire, the destruction of the articles, and the 
surrounding circumstances to the best of their knowledge. 
It is noted further, that as the case was litigated, Gilchrist's rested its defense on a 
rule of law and made no showings of fact at trial. 
62 This result was espoused by Justice Braucher in his dissent. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh: 
at 1792-93, 289 N.E.~d at 885 (dissenting opinion). Concurring in the shifting of the 
burden of proof in this case to the bailee, Justice Braucher dissented from the decision 
insofar as it ordered a new trial. He believed that the trial judge's finding was war-
ranted on the basis of the holding in Bean, 344 Mass. at 676, 184 N.E.2d at 66. See 
discussion in text following note 95 infra. 
63 96 Mass. 448 (1866). 
64 Id. at 454-62 (dissenting opinion). The Bigelow dissent was to afford the basis of 
the court's reasoning in Willett v. Rich, 142 Mass. 356, 7 N.E. 776 (1886), the effect of 
which was to overrule Cass, as was noted by the Knowles court. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1786, 289 N.E.2d at 881. Justice Bigelow was also the author of a prior opinion in 
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a prima facie case was made out by establishing the facts of delivery and 
failure to return. The court reasoned that on the basis of the pleadings 
negligence was not an essential element of the bailor's case. Impossibility 
of performance due to the theft of the goods was thought to be in confes-
sion and avoidance, and if the bailee in that case was to relieve himself 
of liability for the loss, he would have to carry the burden of proof on 
the issue of negligence.65 The court concluded: 
till There may have been conflicting evidence as to how the loss ... oc-
curred, if there was a loss; but the plaintiff did not admit that any 
loss had happened. The breach of the contract was not denied; the 
issue was upon the existence of a sufficient excuse for it. If the de-
fendants indeed prove that the goods are stolen or lost, without 
direct fault on their part, so that performance is impossible, then if 
the plaintiff charges that the loss occurred through negligence, he 
must prove it, and the burden of proof shifts upon him to do so. 
But until some excuse for the breach of contract is shown by the 
defendants, the plaintiff has nothing to prove on the subject.66 
The Cass case thus held that in a bailment action pleaded strictly in 
contract the bailee would be required to answer impossibility as an 
affirmative defense and prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, 
that he had exercised due care. On the other hand, if the bailor had 
sued in tort, thereby founding his action upon negligence, the court 
posited that he would have been obligated to carry the burden of proof 
on that issue.67 The Cass decision therefore stood for the proposition 
that in bailment cases pleaded in contract, the burden of persuasion as 
well as the burden of production was upon the defendant-bailee to show 
his due care. 
Lamb v. Western R.R., 89 Mass. 98, 99 (1863), where the bailor failed to introduce any 
facts "which tended to prove any neglect or omission of duty by the defendants." Id. 
The court in Cass distinguished Lamb on the fact that that case was pleaded in tort 
as well as in contract. 96 Mass at 453. 
65 For a more detailed discussion of impossibility as an affirmative defense in this 
jurisdiction, see notes 106-10 infra and accompanying text. 
66 96 Mass. at 452 (emphasis added). 
67 In the words of the court, 
the defendants contend that this [culpable omission of duty] is the issue neces-
sarily involved in this suit, and that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff 
throughout. If proof of negligence is an essential part of the plaintiff's case, this 
would be so; and the burden of proof would not shift. 
I d. at 452. 
Absent in Cass was any discussion by the court of presumptions. Although the 
prima facie case of delivery and failure to return was evidence of breach of contract, 
negligence was not deemed a part of the bailor's case. No suggestion was made with 
regard to a presumption or inference arising from the prima facie case. Nor was it 
discussed whether such a case could have arisen in tort without an element of negli-
gence affirmatively pleaded and proved. 
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The distinction between actions pleaded in contract and those actions 
pleaded in tort that was promoted in Cass was subsequently abandoned 
in Willet v. Rich,68 where the court adopted Justice Bigelow's argument 
in his earlier dissent in Cass. Reasoning that a bailee was not an insurer 
of goods and would be liable for loss or destruction only if he failed to 
exercise due care while possessing the bailed articles, 69 the court held 
that in actions sounding in either contract or tort it was incumbent upon 
the bailor to plead and carry the ultimate "burden of proof"-more 
precisely, both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion-
on the issue of negligence. Negligence was deemed to be the decisive fact 
issue in an action for breach of contract; accordingly, a denial of negli-
gence, such as an answer of impossibility, was found not to be an 
affirmative defense of the bailee, but rather was regarded as placing that 
issue of due care before the trier of fact as an element of the plaintiff-
bailor's case. 70 But note the admission by the court that 
[w]hatever the form of declaration is, he is required to prove a 
breach of the contract. It may be that, where there is a refusal to 
deliver, the plaintiff may make out a prima facie case, upon proving 
this fact, because such refusal, if unexplained, is some evidence of the 
breach of the contract. But this does not shift the burden originally 
on the plaintiff to prove a breach of contract.n 
This contradictory language prompts the question of what the court was 
actually holding with regard to the elements of the prima facie case. On 
the one hand, the court asserted that negligence was the principal issue in 
a bailment case involving a breach of contract and that negligence must 
be alleged as an element of that cause of action; consequently, negligence 
was to become a part of the prima facie case. But, on the other hand, the 
court suggested that a prima facie case could be made upon a mere show-
ing of delivery and an "unexplained refusal" to return, inasmuch as this 
refusal was "some evidence" of a breach of the bailment contract. It is 
68 142 Mass. 356, 7 N.E. 776 (1886). 
69 The court found that, absent an express provision to the contrary, implied in 
every bailment for hire was the stipulation that a bailee would be liable only upon 
proof of his failure to exercise due care; there was no agreement to keep and return 
the property unconditionally. Id. at 359, 7 N.E. at 778. But see cases cited in note II9 
infra. 
70 Id. at 358, 360, 7 N.E. at 777-78. 
71 Id. at 359-60, 7 N.E. at 778 (emphasis added). Explaining the facts in Cass, the 
Willett court concluded: 
[T]hat the goods were stolen without its fault, was not a matter in discharge or 
avoidance of the plaintiff's case. It did not admit a breach of contract, and set up 
new matter to excuse or avoid the effect of such breach. On the contrary, the evi-
dence went to show that there had been no breach of the defendant's contract ••• 
but [the evidence] denied the plaintiff's case. 
ld. at 360, 7 N.E. at 779. See Justice Bigelow's dissent in Cass, 96 Mass. at 455, which 
formed the basis for this decision. 
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only reasonable to conclude that, while the court did not find that a full-
blown presumption of negligence was operating here, it did believe that 
at least an inference of negligence could be drawn. 72 
This apparent inconsistency was further confused by the court's use of 
the phrase "unexplained refusal." Was it attempting to make some 
distinction between a failure to return and a refusal to return, the latter 
being the only instance when this inference might be drawn?73 And why 
even suggest that the prima facie case would not be complete if there was 
some sort of an explanation? Assuming that no evidence was offered in 
explanation, would a completed prima facie case require or merely 
pemiit a finding for the bailor? And if there was some evidence offered 
as an explanation, how much and of what quality would this evidence 
need be to explain the refusal to deliver? 
Reasoned conjecture suggests that much of this confusion resulted 
from the Willett court's having to justify overruling its prior holding in 
Cass. If the application of Willett in subsequent cases is a fair indication 
of the import of that decision,74 it may be seen that a showing of delivery 
and failure to return on demand has constituted the prima facie case,.and 
that an inference of negligence could be drawn upon the completion of 
the prima facie case. A finding for the bailor has not been required by 
law when the refusal remained unrebutted, but has been permitted if the 
logical persuasiveness of the evidence adduced at trial so predominated. 
It would be advantageous at this juncture to consider what might have 
transpired had the Willett case gone to the trier of fact and had the case 
involved destruction by fire.75 In its final determination, the trier need 
only have been convinced by the bailee that it was as probable as not 
that he was exercising due care in control of the bailed items.76 Since the 
72 It seems an unavoidable conclusion that either an inference or a presumption 
was at work here. How else could a mere showing of delivery and refusal to return 
complete the prima facie case, especially since negligence was deemed the central is-
sue in the bailment case? See Hunter v. Ricke Bros., 127 Iowa 108, 111, 102 N.W. 826, 
827 (1905), where, by implication, the court assumed that it was a presumption op-
erating in Willett. 
73 No discernable distinction can be drawn between a refusal to deliver and a fail-
ure to deliver upon demand. In both instances, the bailee does not return the property 
upon a request by the bailor. 
74 See, e.g., Stevens v. Stewart-Warner Speedometer Corp., 22!1 Mass. 44, 46, 111 
N.E. 771, 772 (1916) (citing Willet to support proposition that the theft of the car could, 
on the evidence, be found as the natural and probable result of defendant's negli-
gence); Murray v. International S.S. Co., 170 Mass. 166, 167-68, 48 N.E. 109!1 (1898) 
(where. plaintiff had the burden of proof to show that defendant-warehouseman was 
negligent). 
75 In Willett, the bailed articles were damaged as a result of the collapse of the 
warehouse. 142 Mass. at !157, 7 N.E. at 776. 
76 As a point of clarification, in a normal civil case the proponent of an issue must 
convince the trier of fact by a fair preponderance of the evidence, in other words, that 
it is more probable than not that his proposition is true. To dissuade the fact-finder 
28
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/5
§2.15 EVIDENCE 75 
bailor would have retained the ultimate burden of proof on the issue 
of negligence, he would have been required to carry that burden by a 
fair preponderance and show that it was more probable than not that the 
bailee was negligent. For the bailee to prevail, he would only need to 
introduce evidence raising sufficient doubt in the mind of the trier, so 
that it would conclude that the balance of probabilities was equal; in 
other words, that it merely was as probable as not that the bailee had 
exercised due care. Although there is nothing particularly out of the ordi-
nary in the discussion to this point, it seems that much of the conceptual 
difficulty surrounding Willett and its subsequent application devolves 
from the central fact that the holding was applied to cases where refusals 
to return were explained by the fact of destruction of the bailed items in 
a fire. At the time of the Willett decision, the showing by a bailee that the 
loss was occasioned by a fire or similar extraordinary event was sufficient 
explanation to rebut the prima facie case in a predominant number of 
jurisdictions.77 This result was possible due to a widely-held belief that 
fires were not uncommon occurrences, and that in the great majority of 
instances the origin and cause were not known to anyone. Therefore, 
it was generally held that it was at least as likely that the fire was due 
to some cause other than bailee negligence, and an inference of negli-
gence was not permitted to be drawn from the mere fact of a fire.Ts 
In those rare situations where a bailor had been able to make showings 
of fact as to the surrounding circumstances of the fire sufficient for a 
reasonable mind to conclude that bailee negligence was more probable 
than not, the issue would have gone to the trier. In such a case, the 
from being so convinced, the opponent must cause sufficient doubt to be raised as to 
the predominance of that proposition. Since a preponderance can be viewed as a 
probability of greater than 51%. the opponent would want to sbow that the likeli-
hood that the fact is not true is better than 49%, or that it is at least 50% probable . 
that the proponent's assertion is false. 
77 See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632, 640 (1916); Liberty Ins. Co. v. 
Central Vt. R. Co., 19 App. Div. 509, 516, 46 N.Y.S. 576, 580 (1897). Contra, Clemenson 
v. Whitney, 238 Ill. App. 308, 3U-14 (1925). See, e.g., Cox v. Central Vt. R. Co., 170 
Mass. 129, 135, 49 N.E. 97, 100 (1898), where the language of the court impliedly sup-
ports the contention that no inference of negligence may be drawn from the mere fact 
of a fire, but that the plaintiff has had to satisfy the jury as to where and how the 
fire originated; absent such proof, a finding for the defendant was required since the 
bailor would thus have failed his burden of proof. Cf. Little v. Lynn Be: Marblehead 
Real Estate Co., 301 Mass. 156, 159, 16 N.E.2d 688, 690-91 (1938). But see discussion 
in text- following note 96 infra. See also R. Brown, Personal Property 369-72 (2d ed. 
1955); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 767 {1931); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 559 (1920). 
78 See, e.g., Metropolitan Elec. Serv. Co. v. Walker, 102 Okla. 102, 103-05, 226 P. 
1042, 1043-45 (1924). But if the bailee had been allocated the burden of producing 
evidence to explain the loss because of a presumption arising from the prima facie 
case, a developing rule was that the bailee's disclosure must offer collateral facts from 
which an inference of due care could be drawn. See McCord v. Atlantic Coast Line 
R.R., 76 S.C. 469, 471, 57 S.E. 477, 478 (1906); Davis v. Tribune Job-Printing Co., 70 
Minn. 95, 98, 72 N.W. 808, 809 (1897). See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R. 559, 561 (1920). 
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bailee would have been unwise to point to the mere fact of the fire with-
out other circumstances more positively indicating his due care.7D A 
bailee who established nothing more than the naked fact of destruction 
by fire, introducing no supporting evidence from which an inference of 
due care could be drawn, would be facing the possibility of an adverse 
judgment. This follows principally because he would have placed the 
trier of fact in the position of having to weigh the bailor's evidence of 
bailee negligence against the bailee's mere showing that it could be 
found to be equally probable that his negligence was not involved in the 
event. 
Wi~out a more definite indication as to the import of its holding in 
Willett regarding the aforementioned presumption/inference problem, 
the court left itself open for the confusion that did, in fact, result from 
subsequent application of the case.80 An excellent example of this general 
confusion is the case of Hanna v. Shaw,81 where the bailor sought re-
covery for an automobile, the motor of which was allegedly damaged 
while in the possession of a garage-keeper as bailee. The court there held: 
We are unable to agree with the contention of the plaintiff that, 
when goods have been delivered to a bailee and have been either 
lost or damaged and the bailee's liability depends upon his negli-
gence, the fact of negligence may be presumed, thereby placing upon 
him the duty of producing evidence of some other cause of loss 
or injury .... This result is in accord with our own decisions and 
those of many other jurisdictions, although there are contrary 
authorities. 82 
Seemingly, then, the Hanna court disagreed with any possible construc-
tion of Willett to the effect that a presumption (or an inference, for that 
matter) is raised from the prima facie case. But the court went further, 
stating: 
We are of opinion that the plaintiff in the circumstances here 
disclosed did not make out a prima facie case merely by showing 
79 The Knowles court discussed the trend of requiring this additional information 
regarding the circumstances of the fire. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1788-89, 289 N.E.2d at 
885. 
80 See Gibbs v. Farmers' Be Merchants' State Bank, 125 Iowa 756, 741, 99 N.W. 705, 
705 (1904), where the court specifically pointed to this difficulty of ambiguity regard-
ing presumptions, citing Willett v. Rich, 142 Mass. 557, 7 N.E. 776 (1886). See also 
Hunter v. Ricke Bros., 127 Iowa 108, 102 N.W. 826 (1905). 
81 244 Mass. 57, 158 N.E. 247 (1925). 
82 Id. at 61, 158 N.E. at 249 (emphasis added). Note the less than precise use of 
language here. Does the court mean delivery in good condition? And, if the court is 
referring to a true presumption, should it not use the phrase "will be presumed" to 
convey the mandatory nature of the rule? 
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that he left the machine in the defendant's garage in good condition, 
and that it was ·in a damaged state the next morning. sa 
77 
In light of the fact bituation and the evidence adduced at trial in 
Hanna, it should be stressed that the language in that case ought not to 
have been given too sweeping an application.M The court there found 
that the evidence tended equally to support two inconsistent proposi-
tions: that the inference of bailee negligence was no more persuasive 
than the inference that it was the bailor who had damaged the auto 
before delivery.811 The prima facie case could not be sustained, because at 
issue was the very fact of delivery in good condition; the court stated that 
"it does not appear that the condition may not have existed when the car 
was left at the garage •.•. "86 It is therefore submitted that the particular 
fact situation in Hanna and not a rule of law determined the court's 
holding in that case. Since the bailor could not show delivery in good 
condition, he failed to make out a prima facie case, and no presumption 
arose, nor could an inference of negligence have been drawn.87 Conse-
quently, the result in this case is consonant with the previously-stated 
conclusion that a prima facie case may be made out by proof of delivery 
in good condition and failure to return, inasmuch as an inference of 
negligence may be drawn from the simple fact of a breach of contract. 88 
Again, there was no mention of the quality and quantity of evidence 
required of the bailee to explain his excuse for non-performance. Exam-
ination of the case reveals, however, that the defendant there was able 
to establish a substantial doubt that either he or his servant had been 
the proximate cause of the damage. Accordingly, Hanna does not deviate 
from the conclusion here offered regarding Willett, as much as it presents 
a distinguishable fact situation and an overly broad statement of the 
holding in that case. 
The court continued to perpetuate confusion in this area of law, 
however inadvertently, in its opinion in Bean v. Security Fur Storage 
88 Id. at 60, IllS N.E. at 248 (emphasis added). 
84 This language was specifically disapproved of in Bean. See note 89 infra and ac-
companying text. 
811 The court reasoned that: 
[t]he inference that the engine had been overheated before the car was left at the 
garage by the plaintiJf, is equally consistent with the inference that it had been 
run and the engine overheated after the car was left there. 
244 Mass. at 60, 1!18 N.E. at 248. 
8il Id. at 59, IllS N.E. at 248. 
8'1 Although not within the scope of this note, it is suggested here that proof of 
delivery in good condition by circumstantial evidence could well present a problem 
in subsequent efforts to build upon it another inference, that of bailee negligence. 
88 The Hanna case has been similarly distinguished by some courts. See Butler v. 
Bowdoin Square Garage, Inc., S29 Mass. 28, lll, 105 N.E.2d 8!18, 8119 (1952); Nationa' 
Dock. &: Storage Warehouse Co. v. United States, 27 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1928). 
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Co.s9 There, in an action "in tort or contract" [sic], the bailor sought to 
recover for the loss of a mink coat while in the possession of the bailee 
for the purpose of cleaning and storage. Sustaining an exception of the 
defendant on the admission of certain interrogatories and remanding, 
the court indicated its views on questions that would arise on retrial: 
While the burden of proving negligence would continue to rest upon 
the plaintiff, the receipt of the coat by the defendant and its disappear-
ance while in the possession of the defendant, which offers no ex-
planation of the disappearance, would permit a finding that the 
defendant was negligent. Regardless of whether one uses the phrase 
disapproved in Hanna v. Shaw, 244 Mass. 57, 61, that "the fact of 
negligence may be presumed" . . . this means that the burden of 
going forward with the evidence falls upon the defendant.90 
The use of the phrases, "which offers no explanation" and "would 
permit a finding" again presents the dual questions of whether this is a 
presumption or an inference at work, and what quantity of evidence is 
necessary to explain the disappearance or loss of the bailed item. If a 
defendant has been allocated the burden of going forward with the 
evidence (the burden of production) on a showing of delivery and failure 
to return, it is a presumption of negligence that has arisen upon com-
pletion of the prima facie case.91 A mere inference would not shift the 
burden of producing evidence in a technical sense; in effect, however, an 
inference once drawn and uncontradicted by persuasive evidence by the 
bailee ordinarily results in a verdict for the proponent on the balance of 
logical probabilities. Although it is difficult to conclude that it is a pre-
sumption at work, since a true presumption would require (and not 
simply permit) a finding of negligence, this somewhat indefinite lan-
guage might have been used simply because the court was merely "indi-
cating its views" and was not affirmatively disposing of the case. An 
additional omission was that no indication was given as to whether or 
not the prima facie case stahds as prima facie evidence of negligence.92 
Notwithstanding these very basic ambiguities, it is submitted that Bean 
should be read as raising both a presumption and an inference of negli-
gence, thus prima facie evidence, as this would seem to be the most 
logical result of the case; this conclusion is offered in spite of the fact 
89 MfMass. 674, 184 N.E.2d 64 (1962). 
oo Id. at 676, 184 N.E.2d at 66 (emphasis added). The court continued: 
We do not believe that the statements in the next to last paragraph of the opinion 
in the Hanna case • • . were intended to convey any contrary impression but, to 
any extent that they do, they are not accurate statements of our law nor of the 
prevailing view elsewhere. 
I d. 
91 See note M supra and accompanying text. 
92 See text at note ll5 supra. 
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that subsequent cases are not truly indicative of the correctness of this 
or any contrary conclusion.Ds 
Regardless of the seemingly contradictory language utilized in the 
various opinions, it is submitted upon the holdings in the cases and their 
subsequent application, and a review of some fundamental rules of evi-
dence, that the state of Massachusetts bailment law directly prior to 
Knowles can be summarized as follows: (1) In either contract or tort, the 
bailor must show delivery in good condition and failure to return on 
demand to establish a prima facie case. An answer by a bailee of impos-
sibility of performance is not an affirmative defense, but puts the fact of 
negligence into issue before the trier. (2) Where the bailor makes out a 
prima facie case, a presumption arises that shifts the burden of produc-
tion to the bailee to "explain" the reason for such a failure. Where the 
bailee does not rebut the presumption of negligence, the rule requires a 
finding for the bailor.94 (3) Even though a presumption only shifts the 
burden of production of evidence, the presumption will persist unre-
butted until the bailee introduces evidence that is believed by the trier of 
fact and is of sufficient probative worth that it would warrant a finding 
contrary to the presumed fact. (4) A prima facie case of bailment stands as 
prima facie evidence of negligence. This means that even in the event 
that the presumption is rebutted, the issue of negligence will go to the 
fact-finder, nonetheless, for a weighing of the probative value of the 
93 See Hale v. Massachusetts Parking Authority, 358 Mass. 470, 471-72, 265 N.E.2d 
494, 495 (1970), where the court seems to have disregarded the words "without ex-
planation" in the Bean case, and focused on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence 
upon which to base the jury's finding of negligence. See also Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. 
Co. v. Capt. Fowler's Marina, Inc., 1143 F. Supp. 1147, 350 (D. Mass. 1971); the court 
there cited Bean in support of its statement that a presumption of negligence "may 
be both equitable and necessary" in cases where the goods are not returned and the 
bailee offers no reasonable explanation. Id. Finding that there was knowledge as to 
the cause of the fire, but nothing was known as to its place of origin, the court dis-
tinguished this case from Bean. For further discussion of Bean, see 9 Ann. Surv. of 
Mass. Law §21.2, at 280 (1962). 
Finally, it should be noted that the Knowles court impliedly assumed that Bean 
has stood for the imposition of a presumption of negligence all along. It is silent, 
however, on the question of whether the prima facie case is prima facie evidence of 
negligence. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1787-88, 289 N.E.2d 882-3. This seemingly innocuous 
and off-handed statement by the court is quite remarkable in itself, given the apparent 
belief among practicing members of the bar .in this jurisdiction that no such presump-
tion existed based on Bean. See generally Brief for Appellee, Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 
1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1783, 289 N.E.2d 879, supporting such a belief by implication. 
114 Note that before any finding is required, the trier must find the basic facts to be 
true. Attention is also directed to the proposition that even if the Knowles court were 
only dealing with an inference, the case should nevertheless have been presented to the 
trier for a weighing of the evidence. The issue would then have come down to the bal-
ancing of an inference of negligence drawn from the bailor's prima facie case, against 
defendant-bailee's reliance on a technical rule of law to the effect that the fact of a 
fire is sufficient to meet his burden of producing evidence to rebut the prima facie 
case. 
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underlying inference of negligence drawn from the facts of the breach of 
contract. 
III. DISPOSING OF Knowles ON THE BASIS OF PRECEDENT 
If this summary of bailment law as it existed at the time of the Knowles 
case is correct, it is necessary to go only one step further to reach the 
conclusion that Bean v. Security Fur Storage Warehouse should have 
controlled, as Justice Braucher suggested.95 The obvious question at this 
point is whether or not evidence of destruction of bailed articles in a fire 
would have been evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of negli-
gence. It is submitted that it is nothing less than absurd to suggest that 
an answer of impossibility due to fire could, in effect, stand as evidence 
of due care; the prevailing law in other jurisdictions would support the 
absurdity of such a suggestion.96 However, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Knowles seems to have concluded that although such a result was irra-
tional, it was technically possible in Massachusetts on the basis of its prior 
holding in Little v. Lynn & Marblehead Real Estate Co.97 This_supposi-
tion, that a fire would stand as evidence of due care, was offered as one 
of the main justifications for the court's ultimate holding that shifted the 
entire burden of proof, comprising both the burden of production and 
the burden of persuasion, to the bailee.98 A brief examination of Little 
will indicate that the court misread the import of that case and that its 
fears of an "irrational result" were somewhat exaggerated. 
The Knowles court cited to the Little case as suggesting that to rebut 
successfully the presumption of negligence arising upon completion of 
the prima facie case, a bailee in this jurisdiction could simply answer 
that the bailed articles were destroyed by fire; this answer of fire would 
in effect stand as evidence of the bailee's due care. In the words of the 
court, 
[ u ]nder this rule, since the bailor has the burden of proving the 
bailee's negligence, the bailee can simply plead impossibility as a 
defence, introduce evidence of a fire and rest as the bailee did in 
95 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1792,289 N.E.2d at 885. 
oo See 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments §§806 et seq. (1968), where offered as a possible re-
conciliation of the cases dealing with loss by fire is the suggestion that in establishing 
the mere fact of loss, the bailee has ordinarily made disclosures from which an in-
ference of due care could be drawn. 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments §820, at 1209-10, and 
cases cited therein. See, e.g., Frissell v. John W. Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. 808, 106 A.2d 
162 (1954); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 286-87, 58 N.E.2d 
658, 664 (1944); Clemenson v. Whitney, 238 Ill. App. 308 (1925). Cf. Liberty Ins. Co. 
v. Central Vt. R. Co., 19 App. Div. 509, 516-17, 46 N.Y.S. 576, 581 (1897). 
97 301 Mass. 156, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938), cited in Knowles, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1786,289 N.E.2d at 882. 
98 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1786-87, 289 N.E.2d at 882-83. 
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the instant case, even though the bailee may be the only party with 
access to the facts surrounding the loss. oo 
81 
It is submitted that the court mistakenly applied the Little case here, and 
that the further suggestion that impossibility was available as a defense 
to the bailee in Knowles is similarly questionable. With respect to the 
Little case, the negligence action there was not between a plaintiff-bailor 
and a bailee as defendant, as the Knowles court so stated,1oo but was 
rather an action by a bailor and bailee as co-plaintiffs, against the owner 
of an adjoining building as defendant.101 While the entire fact situation 
raises doubts as to similarity, the two most striking and pertinent differ-
ences are that: (1) the fire originated in the adjoining building belonging 
to defendant and then spread to plaintiffs' building; and (2) plaintiffs 
ultimately alleged negligence on the part of defendant not as to the 
cause of the fire, but as to his failure to contain the fire properly once it 
had begun.102 
The Knowles court pointed to language in the Little case as indicating 
the problem faced by the court in fixing the burden of proof on the 
bailor. It said: 
The fact that the fire originated in the defendant's premises is not 
evidence that it was started by the defendant; nor is it evidence that 
the fire was caused by any negligence on its part .... The defendant 
is liable if its negligence caused the fire, "but until its cause is known 
or fairly found from the evidence [the fire] cannot be said to be due 
to [the defendant's] negligence."los 
However, it is noted that Little involved a pure negligence issue, not a 
case in bailment; there was no presumption arising nor an inference 
drawable upon the completion of a prima facie case of delivery and 
failure to return. The plaintiffs and defendant made very substantial 
showings of fact as to the circumstances of the fire and the ultimate issue 
99 Id., 289 N.E.2d at 882. 
100 The court explained: 
One serious problem created by fixing the burden of proof on the bailor is 
well illustrated by this court's decision in [Little] •••• In a case with very similar 
facts to those in the instant case, the bailor sued the bailee after a fire in the 
bailee's premises destroyed the bailor's property. 
Id. at 1786, 289 N.E.2d at 882 (emphasis added). 
101 See Little v. Lynn &: Marblehead Real Estate Co., 801 Mass. 156, 157, 16 N.E.2d 
688, 689-90. It should be noted that for the purposes of this inquiry, the fact that the 
complaining parties happened to be in a bailment situation is of no practical conse-
quence here, inasmuch as none of the technical rules as to presumptions and shifting 
burdens would have been operative. 
102 Brief for Plaintiff at 14, Brief for Defendant at 4, Little v. Lynn &: Marblehead 
Real Estate Co., 801 Mass. 156, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938). 
108 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1786, 289 N.E.2d at 882, quoting Little, 801 Mass. at 159, 
16 N.E.2d at 690-91 (citations omitted). 
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of a failure to properly contain the fire. Even most broadly, the Little 
case should be read as only holding that the burden of proof in a negli-
gence action, on facts substantially similar to that case, imposes a require-
ment upon the bailor to show by a fair preponderance that the defendant 
failed to exercise due care with respect to the origin, cause and subse-
quent containment of the fire; the mere fact that a fire originated in 
defendant's premises could not be held as evidence of negligence • 
. The factual and procedural situation in Knowles would thus seem to 
preclude the application of the holding in Little. The bailor in Knowles 
had established a prima facie case and a presumption of negligence 
should have arisen on the authority of Bean. The bailee, having been 
allocated the burden of production of evidence to show his due care, 
answered that the bailor's goods were destroyed in a fire; the actual fact 
of the fire and the loss was stipulated by the bailor.104 Arguably, on the 
basis of Little, the fact of a fire in the defendant's premises would not 
stand as evidence of negligence-in and of itself. But the fact of bailee 
negligence was presumed on completion of the prima facie case, and the 
bailee had the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to 
rebut this presumed fact.10ll Little v. Lynn does not hold that the fact of 
a fire in the defendant's premises can stand as evidence of due care, nor 
does it even hint of the possibility of this "irrational result." 
The Knowles court also suggested that the introduction of evidence 
of a fire would be sufficient to constitute a plea of impossibility of per-
formance, again relying on Little.108 In point of fact, that answer was not 
available to the bailee because such a defense was not technically raised 
in its answer.101 Even if it had been alleged in the answer, impossibility 
of performance is normally an affirmative defense for which the bailee 
must sustain the full burden of proof as to the constituent elements;los 
the trier would have to be convinced that it was more probable than not 
that the bailee was without fault. Furthermore, the defense of impos-
sibility entails the requisite showing by the defendant that the loss in 
question was without the fault of either party.109 Again, even if it could 
104 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1784 n.2, 289 N.E.2d at 880 n.2. 
lOll The very purpose of a presumption is to aid the proponent in sustaining its 
burden of proof. See text at note M supra. 
108 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1788, 289 N.E.2d at 882-85. 
lOT Brief for Appellant, Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1785, 289 
N.E.2d 879 [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]; Answer by Defendant, "Appen· 
dix B," at ii, Knowles v. Gilchrist, Co., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1785, 289 N.E.2d 879. 
However the gist of the second· paragraph of the defendant's answer does imply a 
"confession and avoidance." 
lOB SeeR. Brown, supra note 77,§87, at 578. 
109 "[T]he contract is to be construed not as a positive contract, but as subject to 
an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, perfor-
mance becomes impossible from the GCCidmtal perishing of the thing without the 
fault of either party." Hawkes v. Kehoe, 195 Mass. 419, 425, 79 N.E. 766, 767 (1907) 
(emphasis added; citations omitted). See also Bolton Plate 1: Window Glass Co. v. 
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be applied to this situation, the Little case does not hold that the fact of 
a fire on the defendant's premises is evidence of his due care. Since the 
defendant has the burden of showing that fact by a preponderance, Gil-
christ's would have failed in merely showing the fact of a fire. It is there-
fore concluded that Little v. Lynn is not applicable, that impossibility 
was not available in its usual sense, and that the Knowles court erred in 
propounding the use of the case as a defense. no 
IV. OTHER NOTEWORTHY CoNSIDERATIONS IN Knowles 
In addition to relying upon the Little case, the Knowles court offered 
a second major justification for shifting the burden of proof in cases of 
bailment for hire, namely, the position of a typical bailee of being in the 
peculiar knowledge of the facts.111 While the theory of shifting the 
burden of production through the use of a presumption seems to be 
founded, in part, upon this "better access" problem, caution should be 
exercised by the courts in extending this theory to allow for the shifting 
of the burden of persuasion as well.112 In fact, the court itself presaged 
potential problems involved in the use of the "peculiar access" theory, by 
noting that an expansion of pre-trial discovery could minimize the 
dilemma resulting from a lack of access to information.ns 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the new principle of law established 
by the Knowles decision, there are a number of areas in the court's 
opinion that may engender some measure of controversy in the future 
application of the case as precedent. First, the holding of the case was 
strictly limited to bailments where the bailee has exclusive control over 
the property at the time of destruction or damage.114 This limitation is 
John Bowen Co., !1!15 Mass. 697, 700, 141 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1957) (citing Hawkes); S. 
Williston Be: G. Thompson, Selections From Williston's Treatise on the Law of Con-
tracts §1946, at 919 (19!18). 
110 The Knowles court made no mention of its prior holding in Willett to the effect 
that impolllibility of performance was not an affirmative defense, but put the fact of 
negligence into issue before the trier. See Willett, 142 Mass. at !158, !160, 7 N.E. at 
779; Cass v. Boston Be: Lowell R.R., 96 Mass. 448, 455 (1866) (dissenting opinion). See 
also text at notes 6!1-70 supra. Since an answer by a defendant that he could not de-
liver according to the terms of the contract technically amounts to an answer of im-
polllibility, the court may have been aware of, but merely confused by, the import of 
the holding in Willett. This suggestion is supported by the fact that the practical 
effect in both situations is the same. However, it is not seen why the court confused 
the matter by use of the term "impolllibility." 
Ul 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1791, 289 N.E.2d at 884. 
112 "This consideration [of one party being in the peculiar knowledge of the facts] 
should not be overemphasized. Very often one must plead and prove matters as to 
which his adversary has superior access to the proof." C. McCormick, Evidence §!1!17, 
at 787 (2d ed. 1972). 
111 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1791 n.4, 289 N.E.2d at 884 n.4. 
lU ld. 
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obviously in line with the basic rationale of the holding, since only in 
cases in which the bailee has exclusive control should he be regarded as 
being in the peculiar knowledge of the facts. The concept of "exclusive 
control," however, was not explicitly defined in the text of the opinion. 
It is certainly conceivable that a bailee would attempt to argue non-
exclusive control so as to remove his case from the ambit of Knowles. 
For example, should a sub-bailment fall within this non-exclusive cate-
gory? Secondly, there is language in the opinion indicating that the court 
was swayed in its decision by the fact that the bailor in this case was a 
consumer;1111 the holding, nevertheless, was not expressly limited to 
consumers. Will the Knowles rule apply to bailors who are businessmen 
or others who fall outside the class of consumers? The issue here comes 
down to whether or not a businessman's knowledge of general trade· 
practices and the conventional application of rules regarding bailee 
liability and risk of loss would outweigh the likelihood that the bailee 
would have access to more facts and thus exempt these non-consumers 
from the rule. The higher probability that a businessman will be aware 
of more facts-if only because of the greater value of goods involved-
would seem to provide a legitimate argument against shifting the burden 
of persuasion to a bailee who might have no greater actual knowledge of 
these surrounding circumstances than any other party involved. These 
ultimate questions of "who knows what" and "who should know what" 
present a difficult problem where there is no information available to 
either party.ne The fundamental policy question here seems to be whether 
the bailee can justifiably be allocated the burden of producing evidence 
merely because it is more likely that he would know these surrounding 
circumstances. Although the Knowles court definitely opts for this solu-
tion to the "access of information" dilemma, there does not seem to be 
any clear-cut reason to support this selection-other than a general public 
policy to protect unwary consumers-where the bailee, in good faith, 
pleads ignorance of the material circumstances. 
Another important consideration is the retroactive application of 
Knowles. It is not unreasonable to expect bailors to claim that, since 
Knowles promulgates a new rule of procedure only, the rule should 
pertain to all cases regardless of when the bailment agreement was con-
summated. Inasmuch as the court did not increase the liability of the 
bailee by imposing any greater duty of care, it is not seen how a due 
process argument by a bailee could defeat an argument for retroactive 
application. It seems that the only feasible approach would be to hy-
pothesize as to the undue burden that such application might place on 
1111 Id. at 1790,289 N.E.2d at 883-84. 
118 See Fireman's Fund Am. Ina. Co. v. Capt. Fowler's Marina, Inc., MS F. Supp. 
347, 550 (D. Mus. 1971). Notice that where the bailor retains the ultimate burden of 
persuasion on the issue of negligence, it ia most advantageous to the bailee's position 
that litde or no information as to the c:m:umstancea of the fire be diaclosed. 
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the court in terms of the number of cases that could potentially be 
litigated. However, it is submitted that the very fact that the rnle was 
promulgated in the first instance is a fairly good indication that one 
intention of the court was to open up such avenues of litigation. It is 
thus apparent that the Knowles rule should be given retroactive effect. 
In limiting the scope of its holding, the court expressly excluded cases 
where the bailee has contracted himself "irrespective of due care."111 As 
was mentioned earlier,us this exception must be viewed as surplusage to 
the holding in the case. First, as was convincingly argued by the plain-
tiff-bailor in her brief, three Massachusetts cases could well have sup-
ported the contention that an implied contract existed in Knowles so as 
to bring the case within the ambit of those prior decisions upholding strict 
liability on the contract in spite of the absence of precise words.119 With 
this in mind, it seems that the Knowles court has disregarded these cases 
and would not accept such an obligation arising by implication. If this 
is the case, the exception would seem to have little or no practical ap-
plication for the following reason. Under most bailee insurance policies, 
the insurer disclaims responsibility for any loss sustained by the bailee 
where he has bound himself, by contract or other agreement, to a 
standard of care in excess of that which is applied by the courts of that 
jurisdiction. Bailees in Massachusetts are bound to exercise reasonable 
due care.120 Thus, assuming that most bailees will regulate their con-
tractual obligations in light of insurance coverage, it is highly improbable 
that they would enter into express contractual commitments even hinting 
of strict liability. One can only wonder whether the stated exclusion 
is meant to provide a means of accepting an implied obligation at some 
point in the future. 
It is nonetheless an inescapable conclusion that where the contractual 
liability is not founded upon fault, the Knowles case would not apply in 
any event. This second reason for viewing this exception with some doubt 
is even more devastating in a practical sense. Inasmuch as the essential 
issue in Knowles was proof of negligence, where proof of negligence is 
not at issue, the case is inapplicable. If a bailee has contractually com-
mitted himself irrespective of due care, he has bound himself to strict 
liability; fault is of no consequence on the basis of that agreement. There-
fore the Knowles rule would not directly apply to litigation ensuing 
between those contracting parties. 
In moving from a review of some of the more pertinent substantive and 
conceptual difficulties with the Knowles opinion itself, it is advantageous 
111 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1792,289 N.E.2d at 885. 
118 See note 9 supra. 
119 Brief for Appellant, supra note 107, at 2, citing Drake v. White, 117 Mass. 10 
(1875); Perrault v. Circle Club, Inc., 326 Mass. 458, 95 N.E.2d 204 (1950); Industron 
Corp. v. Waltham Door &: Window Co., !146 Mass. 18, 190 N.E.2d 211 (1963). 
120 See note 14 supra. 
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at this point to consider two arguments that the court might have ad-
vanced in support of its final result, these in addition to the reasoning 
regarding possession and control of the bailed items, the almost exclusive 
access to information, and the very existence of the presumption. The 
first is an identifiable trend in dealing with presumptions, especially 
those with a strong basis in public policy. As presented by Professors 
Morgan121 and McCormick,122 the theory would cast upon the bailee not 
only the burden of going forward with the evidence, but the burden of 
persuasion as well. Usually, when the bailor has retained the burden 
of persuasion on the issue of negligence by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, with only the burden of production shifting, he has lost the case 
where the contrary proposition of due care has be~ equally persuasive; 
in other words, the plaintiff-bailor only convinced the trier that negligence 
was as probable as not. However, both writers have advocated the shifting 
of the burden of persuasion as well, inasmuch as the existence of a reason 
substantial enough to put the bailee to producing his evidence should 
also control a finding against him where the fact-finder has a reasonable 
doubt.128 In modified form, this theory of a less easily rebutted and more 
durable presumption has been accepted in the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence,124 in the Federal Rules of Evidence,12G and in the courts of a 
number of jurisdictions.12s 
It is worth mentioning at this point that the Supreme Judicial Court 
would have done well to view the Knowles case as an. opportunity to 
clarify some of the problems raised earlier in this note regarding the use 
of presumptions in this jurisdiction.12T This is especially important in 
light of the fact that much of the court's discussion offered to justify the 
121 Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 
Harv. L. Rev. 59, 8!1 (19!1!1). 
122 C. McCormick, supra note 108, §!145, at 826. 
128 In responding to the assertion that it is settled law that the burden of per-
suasion never shifts, Professor McCormick has answered that this burden of convinc-
ing the jury need not be fixed until the evidence is to go to these fact-finders. 
Recognizing that the weight of authority firmly supports the allocation at the com-
mencement of trial, he concluded that the policy behind presumptions is stronger 
than that· of setting the requirement of proof at the outset of the proceedings. Id. at 
827. Contra, 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2486 (!ld ed. 1940). 
124 Rule 14 proposes that if there is probative value to the underlying evidence, 
the burden of showing the nonexistence of the presumed fact would be allocated to 
the opponent. If the underlying facts have no probative value, the factual determina-
tion would be made as if no presumption had been involved. 
125 Rule !101 provides in part: "[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom 
it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is 
more probable than its existence." But note that Rule !102 holds that state law will 
govern a presumption regarding an element of a claim or defense. 
128 See, e.g., Frissell v. John W. Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. !108, !112, 106 A.2d 162, 164 
(1954). 
12T For an example the court might have followed, see Hinds v. John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. !149, 155 A.2d 721 (1959). 
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shifting of the burden of proof specifically in bailments for hire could 
similarly apply in many other situations where presumptions have arisen 
on the basis of policy or probabilities. A general rule dealing with the 
broader problems involved would, in the long run, have been much more 
beneficial than approaching the issue, as the court did, in piecemeal 
fashion. 
The other argument devolves from what can be described as an 
emerging theory in the field of negligence, particularly in those areas 
where the culpability of the defendant has been less than the primary 
concern.t28 In their attempts to make the plaintiff "whole" again, some 
courts have focused upon the question of which of the parties would be 
the best conduit of the loss. The theory is not completely akin to the 
"deep-pocket" theory in master-servant liability, in that it does not neces-
sarily seek out the party with the greatest assets. Rather, the court has 
looked to the party best able to indemnify for the loss immediately and 
then pass the cost back to others (usually the consumer). Under the 
typical bailment situation, the bailor's goods are not covered inde-
pendently under any type of homeowner's insurance. The bailee could 
insure the goods while in his possession, and then recoup this minor ex-
penditure by an equalizing increase in cost per item; the burden should 
not be onerous for' either party.129 This consideration should be given 
thought, since the practical effect of the Knowles rule is to make the 
bailee an insurer in those situations in which he has been without fault, 
but cannot produce information sufficient to prove his own due care. 
Now that the bailee has the risk of non-persuasion on that issue, he 
would receive the adverse verdict, not the bailor. 
In this general regard it should be noted that in the concluding lan-
guage of the case, the court stated that the bailee must show "that he has 
exercised due care to prevent the property's loss or destruction."130 It is 
128 Cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 440, 191 N.E.2d 81, 
85, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (196!1) (dissenting opinion). 
129 This statement should be qualified to the extent that a bailee with a large ware-
house who stores vast amounts of highly valued goods will not be able to afford li-
ability insurance in most instances. The Knowles case puts such bailees in the position 
of having to absorb potential losses on their own, which result seems unfair at first 
glance. However, balanced against this apparent unfairness is the plight of the many 
consumers who have found thentselves without legal recourse to recover for lost goods. 
Given the bailor's lack of access to information, the potential benefit to be derived 
from assisting these bailors greatly outweighs the problems that might ensue in these 
isolated situations. 
Another consideration is the effect upon warehousemen of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, as enacted in G.L c. 106, §7-40ll(l)(b), providing that bailees must plead and 
prove due care when warehouse receipts have been issued. Note the possible applica-
tion of the Knowles court's statement that "[i]t is in the interest of simplicity and uni-
formity that the same rule apply whether or not a warehouse receipt is issued." 1972 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1792, 289 N.E.2d at 885. 
tao Knowles, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1792, 289 N.E.2d at 885. 
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clear from this language that the court has imposed upon the bailee a 
weighty burden to prove non-negligence. The bailee must come f()rward 
with information as to "what actually happened to the goods and what 
safeguards existed both before and after the precipitating event ••. ,"181 
Litigators are aware, of course, of the evidentiary problems posed by 
having to prove a negative fact, which is here an absence of negligence. 
CoNCLUSION 
The rule enunciated in the Knowles case-that the bailee will now 
bear the risk of non-persuasion on the issue of negligence in bailments 
for hire where a prima fade case has been made-appears to be a just 
and equitable solution to the problems encountered by a bailor in 
proving that bailee negligence was the cause of his loss. Fairness dictates 
that a person who has entrusted his possessions to another for their 
mutual benefit generally ought to be compensated for loss of or damage to 
the possessions while in the control of the bailee. The unfortunate result 
of having a bailor sustain the risk of loss in many instances has resulted 
from his lack of access to information regarding the loss. Since the bailor 
has had to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion as to bailee negligence, 
he has most often been unable to sustain his case. To aid the bailor in 
meeting this burden of persuasion, negligence has been presumed upon the 
making of a prima fade case of delivery and failure to return. It is 
simply incongruous that the policy giving rise to the presumption in the 
first place-that of obtaining information from the bailee-should not 
keep the artificial compelling effect of the device operative until the 
bailee has come forward with sufficient facts to show that due care is at 
least as probable as not. And the better rule, given the fact of possession 
and control of the articles by the bailee, the balance of probabilities in 
favor of the bailor, and the bailee's near exclusive access to facts of the 
loss itself, is that the bailee be allocated the burden of affirmatively 
proving due care by a fair preponderance of the evidence. This is the 
rule adopted in Knowles, making due care an affirmative defense to be 
pleaded and proved by the defendant-bailee, and presenting a question 
of fact for the trier in all cases where negligence is contested. 
While the Knowles rule itself should be hailed as a positive step in 
solving the problem of a bailor's having to prove negligence when few if 
any facts are known to him, it ought to be recognized that the court was 
not compelled by the facts of the case to go as far as it did to reach a 
result favorable to Mrs. Knowles; the ultimate burden of persuasion 
could have remained with the bailor and the same result reached. In 
effect, then, the Supreme Judicial Court "legislated" a new rule of law 
181 Id. at 1791, 289 N.E.2d at 884. 
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in bailment situations for mutual benefit. And the question of whether 
or not this new rule can withstand future attacks because of the "judicial 
law-making" aspects of the case certainly depends on the logical per-
suasiveness of the opinion itsel£.132 
If the discussion, clarification and criticsms presented herein can be 
deemed essentially correct in substance, the reasoning offered by the 
Knowles court in the decision could well detract from its future applica-
tion. On the debit side of the argument, the lack of clarity in dealing 
with the various evidentiary concepts as well as prior case law, the con-
fusion with regard to an answer of impossibility of performance, and the 
mistaken application of Little v. Lynn are the most striking examples of 
weaknesses in the court's position. To its credit, however, is the fact that 
the problem of bailor proof was in need of a solution, and the one 
selected in Knowles is not much different than a statutory rule that has 
been imposed in a very similar situation.1ss It seems that the most funda-
mental problem with the opinion is that the court did not deal with the 
focal issue of destruction by fire in the most direct and forthright manner 
possible. 
Unless bailees for hire can be expected to assume this "new" burden of 
proving due care by a preponderance without some measure of resistance, 
it is unfortunate, but foreseeable, that the Supreme Judicial Court will 
be faced with the proposition of further discussion and clarification of 
the opinion and the holding in Knowles.1s4 
ROBERT B. CARPENTER 
132 This is not to suggest that the courts should not legislate when a remedy is 
necessary. Rather, it is merely submitted that whereas legislative enactments receive 
their ultimate legitimacy through the ballot box, a judicial rule must essentially rely 
upon the logical persuasiveness of the supporting opinion for acceptance. 
133 See notes 11 8c 129 supra. 
134 Consider the following situation: a jury is presented a question of fact, to de-
termine whether a corporate bailor should be compensated for the loss of $20,000 
worth of merchandise while in the possession of a self-employed bailee-warehouseman. 
These very facts were presented in the recent case of Lorillard Corp. v. Federal Ware-
house, Inc., Civil No. 70-18-F (D. Mass., June 6, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1212, 
1st Cir., June 18, 197!1, where the jury found the defendant "not guilty." The judge 
had charged as to the Knowles rule, and from the circumstances shown at trial re-
garding the loss, it was almost certain that the bailee had been negligent. It may be 
that the ultimate effect of Knowles will be to allow the jury a more free hand in re-
sponding to their visceral "feelings" about who is right or wrong. Inasmuch as a fact 
issue is always presented on the completion of the prima facie case, the jury will be 
less constrained in considering "fairness" in a particular case and entering judgment 
as justice dictates, regardless of who is the bailor and who is the bailee. 
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